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Success	  through	  Failure:	  	  
Wittgenstein	  and	  the	  Romantic	  Preface	  
Mark	  W.	  Rowe	  
Arguing	  that	  there’s	  something	  to	  be	  learned	  about	  Wittgenstein’s	  Philosophical	  Investi-­‐
gations	   by	   considering	   it	   in	   the	   context	   of	   two	   famous	   British	   Romantic	   poems	   	   –	  
Wordsworth’s	  The	  Prelude	  and	  Coleridge’s	  Kubla	  Khan	  –	  might	  seem	  extravagant,	  but	  I	  
hope	  some	  general	  and	  detailed	  reflections	  on	  the	  topic	  may	  show	  that	  the	  comparison	  
is	  illuminating	  and	  fruitful.	  	  	  
In	   1933-­‐4,	   Wittgenstein	   jotted	   down	   a	   general	   remark	   which	   might	   encourage	   a	  
comparison	  between	  philosophy	  and	  poetry:	  	  
I	  believe	  I	  summed	  up	  where	  I	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  philosophy	  when	  I	  said:	  really	  one	  should	  
write	  philosophy	  only	  as	  one	  writes	  a	  poem.	  That,	   it	  seems	  to	  me,	  must	  reveal	  how	  far	  my	  
thinking	   belongs	   to	   the	   present,	   the	   future,	   or	   the	   past.	   For	   I	   was	   acknowledging	  myself,	  
with	  these	  words,	  to	  be	  someone	  who	  cannot	  quite	  do	  what	  he	  would	  like	  to	  be	  able	  to	  do.	  
(Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  28e)	  	  
While	  a	  remark	  from	  1929	  encourages	  the	  link	  with	  early	  Romanticism:	  	  
I	   often	  wonder	  whether	  my	   cultural	   ideal	   is	   a	   new	  one,	   i.e.,	   contemporary,	   or	  whether	   it	  
comes	  from	  the	  time	  of	  Schumann.	  At	  least	  it	  strikes	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  that	  ideal,	  though	  
not	  the	  continuation	  that	  actually	  followed	  it	  then.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  
Century	  has	  been	   left	  out.	  This,	   I	  ought	   to	  say,	  has	  happened	  quite	   instinctively	  &	  […]	  was	  
not	  the	  result	  of	  reflection.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  4e)	  	  
Schumann’s	   career	   lasted	   roughly	   between	   1829	   and	   1853,	   and	   that	   would	   seem	  
considerably	  later	  than	  the	  first	  version	  of	  The	  Prelude	  and	  Kubla	  Khan	  which	  were	  writ-­‐
ten	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  But	  here	  we	  must	  remember	  that	  Roman-­‐
ticism	  in	  music	  emerged	  considerably	  later	  than	  Romanticism	  in	  literature,	  and	  that	  the	  
main	   literary	   influences	   on	   Schumann	   –	   E.T.A.	   Hoffmann	   (1776-­‐1822)	   and	   Jean	   Paul	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Richter	  (1763-­‐1825)	  –	  were	  men	  who	  were	  born	  between	  three	  and	  four	  decades	  earlier	  
than	  the	  composer.	  
These	  thoughts	  might	  help	   license	  a	   link	  between	  poetry	  and	  philosophy,	  and	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  and	  German	  Romanticism,	  but	  why	  should	  we	  expect	  any	   interesting	  similari-­‐
ties	  to	  emerge	  between	  German	  and	  British	  Romanticism?	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  it’s	  
worth	  observing	  that,	  from	  the	  early	  1790s,	  Wordsworth	  and	  Coleridge	  had	  a	  profound	  
interest	  in	  what	  they	  had	  heard	  of	  cultural	  developments	  in	  Germany	  –	  what	  we	  would	  
now	  think	  of	  as	  early	  German	  Romanticism.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	   interest,	   in	  1798-­‐9,	  they	  
spent	  eighteen	  months	  in	  the	  country	  leaning	  the	  language	  and	  imbibing	  the	  culture	  at	  
first	  hand.	  Coleridge	  spent	  most	  of	  his	  time	  in	  university	  towns,	  assimilating	  recent	  liter-­‐
ary	  trends	  and	  the	  philosophical	   idealism	  of	  Kant	  and	  his	   followers,	  and	  his	  continuing	  
interest	  in	  German	  culture	  is	  shown	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  translated	  Schiller’s	  Wallenstein	  
into	  English	  when	  he	  got	  home.	  The	  exact	  date	  of	   ‘Kubla	  Khan’’s	   composition	  has	  not	  
been	  established,	  but	  it	  is	  known	  to	  date	  from	  1797-­‐8,	  and	  it’s	  quite	  possible	  that	  Cole-­‐
ridge	  revised	  it	  during	  his	  German	  sojourn	  (Some	  revision	  of	  the	  poem	  is	  not	  incompati-­‐
ble	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   main	   inspiration	   came	   to	   Coleridge	   in	   an	   opium-­‐induced	  
trance	  or	  sleep.	  It	  seems	  unlikely,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  punctuation	  was	  dictated	  by	  his	  
dream).	  Over	  the	  same	  period,	  Wordsworth	  and	  his	  sister	  were	  isolated	  and	  miserable	  
in	  Goslar,	  but	  the	  poet	  leant	  German	  thoroughly	  and	  began	  to	  write	  the	  first	  version	  of	  
The	   Prelude.	   If	  Wittgenstein	   felt	   his	   outlook	   derived	   from	  early	  German	  Romanticism,	  
and	  Wordsworth	  and	  Coleridge	  were	  also	  soaked	   in	  this	  culture,	   then	   it	   looks	  as	   if	   the	  
works	  of	  all	  three	  share	  at	  least	  one	  common	  point	  of	  origin.	  
In	  the	  first	  section	  below,	  I	  want	  to	  show	  why	  we	  should	  think	  of	  the	  Investigations	  
as	  a	  late	  but	  central	  text	  of	  Romanticism,	  largely	  by	  comparing	  it	  with	  The	  Prelude	  (the	  
Investigations	  and	  The	  Prelude	  both	  exemplify	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  Romanticism	  which	  em-­‐
phasizes	  the	  pastoral	  and	  authentic:	  they	  contain	  no	  Byronic	  or	  Napoleonic	  elements;	  no	  
self-­‐dramatizing,	  attitudinizing	  or	  rejoicing	  in	  sexual	  glamour	  and	  military	  glory).	  	  In	  the	  
second	  section,	  I	  shall	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  briefly	  compare	  the	  Investigations	  with	  Kubla	  
Khan,	  but	  my	  main	  aim	  will	  be	  to	  explore	  the	  prefaces	  to	  all	  three	  works,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  
showing	  what	  is	  characteristically	  Romantic	  about	  the	  Preface	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  book.	  
1.	  What	   parallels	   can	   we	   find	   between	   the	   Investigations	   and	   The	   Prelude?	   The	   root	  
metaphor	  which	  underlies	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	   is	   that	  of	  a	   journey	  (The	   journey	  meta-­‐
phor,	  and	  also	  the	  Goethe/Wittgenstein	  notion	  of	  an	  Übersicht,	  are	  examined	  in	  greater	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depth	   in	   “Wittgenstein’s	  Romantic	   Inheritance”.	  The	   rest	  of	   the	   current	  essay	  pursues	  
different	  themes	  ):	  
[A	  philosophical	  investigation]	  compels	  us	  to	  travel	  criss-­‐cross	  in	  every	  direction	  over	  a	  wide	  
field	   of	   thought.	   –	   The	   philosophical	   remarks	   in	   this	   book	   are,	   as	   it	   were,	   a	   number	   of	  
sketches	  of	  landscapes	  which	  were	  made	  in	  the	  course	  of	  these	  long	  meandering	  journeys.	  
(Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  3e-­‐4e)	  
Language	   is	  a	   labyrinth	  of	  paths.	  You	  approach	   from	  one	   side	  and	  you	  know	  your	  way	  
about;	  you	  approach	   the	  same	  place	   from	  another	   side	  and	  no	   longer	  know	  your	  way	  
about.	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  203)	  
A	   philosophical	   problem	   has	   the	   form:	   «I	   don’t	   know	   my	   way	   about».	   (Wittgenstein	  
[2009]:	  123)	  
The	  metaphorical	  landscape	  is	  rural,	  and	  although	  it	  is	  criss-­‐crossed	  by	  paths	  one	  can	  
easily	  become	  lost.	  The	  landscape	  tends	  to	  be	  mountainous	  («The	  valleys	  of	  foolishness	  
have	  more	   grass	   growing	   in	   them	   for	   the	   philosopher	   than	   do	   the	   barren	   heights	   of	  
cleverness»;	  Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  92e);	  and	  the	  person	  making	  the	  journey	  is	  portrayed	  
as	  a	  solitary	  wanderer	  –	  specifically,	  a	  walker:	  «in	  philosophizing	  it	   is	   important	  for	  me	  
to	  keep	  changing	  my	  position	  […]	  like	  someone	  on	  a	  long	  up-­‐hill	  climb	  who	  walks	  back-­‐
wards	   for	   a	   while	   to	   revive	   himself,	   stretch	   some	   different	   muscles»	   (Wittgenstein	  
[1998]:	  32e).	  This	  walker	  is	  either	  exploring	  the	  landscape	  for	  his	  own	  sake,	  or	  is	  scout-­‐
ing	   ahead	   to	   warn	   those	   that	   follow	   of	   potential	   dangers	   (Wittgenstein	   [1198]:	   25e,	  
64e);	   and	  because	  his	  purpose	   is	   coming	   to	   know	  his	   environment,	  he	  has	  no	   specific	  
destination,	  but	  either	  roams	  the	  landscape	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  exploring	  it,	  or	  wanders	  as	  
the	  whim	  takes	  him.	  
We	   can	   find	   a	   very	   similar	   set	   of	   circumstances	   in	   The	   Prelude.	   The	   two	   opening	  
books	  portray	  an	  often	   solitary	  boy,	   freed	   from	  work	  and	  duties,	  exploring	   the	  moun-­‐
tains,	  lakes	  and	  valleys	  of	  his	  native	  Cumbria	  on	  foot;	  while	  the	  introductory	  section	  de-­‐
scribes	  the	  young	  adult	  Wordsworth	  leaving	  London,	  having	  been	  freed	  from	  the	  neces-­‐
sity	  of	  working	  by	  a	  legacy,	  and	  deciding	  which	  direction	  he	  should	  walk	  in:	  
Long	  months	  of	  ease	  and	  undisturbed	  delight	  
Are	  mine	  in	  prospect;	  wither	  shall	  I	  turn,	  
By	  road	  or	  pathway,	  or	  through	  trackless	  field,	  
Up	  hill	  or	  down,	  or	  shall	  some	  floating	  thing	  
Upon	  the	  river	  point	  me	  out	  my	  course?	  	  
(Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  26-­‐30)	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Wordsworth	   shows	   the	   development	   of	   a	   poet	   who	   frequently	   writes	   about	   the	  
landscapes	  he	  remembers	  wandering	  through;	  Wittgenstein	  portrays	  himself	  as	  an	  artist	  
who	  sketches	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  landscape	  he	  has	  seen	  from	  different	  angles	  and	  
directions.	  He	  describes	   the	   Investigations	   as	   an	   album	  of	   such	   sketches;	   and	   this	   de-­‐
scription	   also	   suits	  The	   Prelude	   –	   it	   is	   not	   a	   full	   autobiography,	   but	   a	   series	   of	   poetic	  
sketches	  loosely	  sewn	  together.	  These	  sketches	  are	  designed	  to	  endorse	  and	  underpin	  a	  
general	  philosophical	  view	  of	  man,	  nature	  and	  society;	  and	   the	  same	   is	   clearly	   true	  of	  
the	  Investigations.	  	  
Wordsworth	  once	  said	  that	  he	  had	  to	  create	  the	  taste	  by	  which	  he	  was	  appreciated,	  
and	  one	  aspect	  of	  eighteenth-­‐century	  taste	  he	  had	  to	  overturn	  was	  intellectuals’	  lack	  of	  
interest	  in	  childhood	  and	  the	  contempt	  they	  felt	  for	  those	  who	  wrote	  about	  it.	  For	  most	  
Augustan	  writers,	  children	  were	  irrational,	  immoral	  and	  infantile	  and	  thus	  of	  little	  inter-­‐
est	   to	   grown	   men;	   the	   early	   eighteenth-­‐century	   poet	   Ambrose	   Philips,	   who	   thought	  
children	   worth	   writing	   for,	   was	   nick-­‐named	   “Namby-­‐Pamby”	   for	   his	   trouble,	   and	   the	  
soubriquet	   remains	  an	  English	   idiom	   for	  everything	  weak,	   sentimental	  and	  moist-­‐eyed	  
(see	  Sutherland	  [1948]:	  1-­‐43).	  By	  contrast,	  Wordsworth	  –	  and	  Romanticism	  generally	  –	  
placed	  great	  emphasis	  on	   childhood	  experiences:	  most	  of	   the	   famous	  passages	   in	  The	  
Prelude	  occur	  in	  Books	  One	  and	  Two	  and	  are	  almost	  exclusively	  concerned	  with	  Words-­‐
worth’s	  experience	  as	  a	  boy	  and	  youth.	   In	   this	  work,	  he	   is	  also	   interested	   in	  a	   specific	  
aspect	  of	  childhood:	  the	  poem	  is	  subtitled	  “Growth	  of	  a	  Poet’s	  Mind”	  and	  his	  attention	  
is	  focused	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  education	  he	  received	  from	  men	  and	  –	  more	  importantly	  –	  Na-­‐
ture.	  	  
The	  Investigations,	  in	  contrast	  with	  many	  other	  philosophical	  classics	  (including	  Witt-­‐
genstein’s	   own	   Tractatus),	   takes	   childhood	   very	   seriously:	   we	   are	   invited	   to	   consider	  
children’s	  ability	  to	  think	  (see	  Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  32),	  the	  oddity	  of	  their	  drawings,	  the	  
names	  they	  give	  to	  dolls	  (see	  Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  27),	  playing	  with	  a	  ball	  (see	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	   [2009]:	   66),	   playing	   at	   trains	   (see	  Wittgenstein	   [2009]:2282),	   using	   a	   chest	   as	   a	  
play-­‐house;	  and	  pretending	  generally	  (see	  Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  249)1.	  Like	  Wordsworth,	  
Wittgenstein’s	   interest	   is	   centred	  on	  how	  children	  are	   taught,	   inducted	  and	  educated,	  	  
1	  Wordsworth	  too	  was	   interested	  in	  the	  major	  role	   imitation	  and	  pretence	  played	  in	  childhood,	  
but	  he	  was	  generally	  depressed	  by	  the	  spectacle:	  «Then	  will	  he	  fit	  his	  tongue	  /	  To	  dialogues	  of	  
business,	   love,	  or	  strife;	  /	  But	   it	  will	  not	  be	   long	  /	  Ere	  this	  be	  thrown	  aside,	  /	  And	  with	  new	  joy	  
and	  pride	  /	  The	  little	  Actor	  cons	  another	  part,	  /	  Filling	  from	  time	  to	  time	  his	  “humorous	  stage”	  /	  
With	  all	  the	  Persons	  down	  to	  palsied	  Age,	  /	  That	  Life	  brings	  with	  her	  in	  her	  Equipage;	  /	  As	  if	  his	  
whole	  vocation	  /	  Were	  endless	  imitation»	  (Wordsworth	  [1984]:	  300).	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and	   there	   can	   be	   little	   doubt	   that	   this	   change	   in	  Wittgenstein’s	   outlook	   came	   about	  
through	  his	  experience	  as	  a	  primary-­‐school	  teacher	  and	  his	  involvement	  in	  the	  Austrian	  
School	  Reform	  Movement	   (see	  Savickey	   [1999]:	   49-­‐76).	  Accordingly,	   there	  are	  numer-­‐
ous	   pedagogic	   scenes	   in	   the	   Investigations:	   we	   are	   asked,	   for	   example,	   to	   recall	   how	  
children	  are	  taught	  the	  names	  of	  sensations	  (Wittgentein	  [2009]:	  244,	  257),	  or	  to	  learn	  
language	   in	  general	   (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  5-­‐9,	  32);	   indeed,	  the	  book	  as	  a	  whole	  begins	  
by	  quoting	  an	  author	  recalling	  a	  childhood	  scene	  –	  or	  what	  he	  takes	  to	  be	  a	  childhood	  
scene	  –	  of	  “grown-­‐ups”	  teaching	  him	  the	  names	  of	  objects.	  
The	   British	   Romantic	   poets	   were	   deeply	   suspicious	   of	   abstract	   theory,	   largely	   be-­‐
cause	  they	  felt	  such	  theories	  made	  the	  wonderful	  commonplace	  and	  simultaneously	  de-­‐
stroyed	  true	  emotion	  and	  the	  power	  of	  genuine	  observation.	  	  	  Keats	  wrote:	  «Philosophy	  
will	  clip	  an	  Angel's	  wings,	  /	  Conquer	  all	  mysteries	  by	  rule	  and	  line,	  /	  Empty	  the	  haunted	  
air,	   and	  gnomed	  mine	  –	   /	  Unweave	  a	   rainbow»	   (Keats	   [1999]:	   193).	  Wordsworth	   is,	   if	  
anything,	  even	  more	  scornful:	  besides	  the	  famous	  line	  “we	  murder	  to	  dissect”	  (Words-­‐
worth	  [1984]:	  131),	  he	  dismisses	  the	  analytic	  thinker	  as	  follows:	  «Philosopher	  art	  thou?	  
One	  all	  eyes,	  /	  Philosopher!	  A	  fingering	  slave?	  One	  that	  would	  peep	  and	  botanize	  /	  Upon	  
his	  mother’s	  grave?»	  (Wordsworth	  [1984]:	  151).	  And	  even	  Coleridge,	  the	  most	  theoreti-­‐
cally	  inclined	  of	  this	  generation,	  came	  to	  believe	  his	  taste	  for	  metaphysics	  and	  abstruse	  
reflection	  had	  helped	  destroy	  his	  powers	  of	  imagination	  (Coleridge	  [1991]:	  367).	  
Whatever	  his	  doubts	  about	  Romanticism,	  Goethe	  was	  also	  suspicious	  of	  abstraction	  
and	  the	  analytic	  intellect,	  and	  in	  his	  scientific	  work	  developed	  an	  account	  of	  explanation	  
that	   managed	   both	   to	   preserve	   the	   immediacy	   of	   perceptual	   experience	   and	   of	   our	  
emotional	  responses	  to	  it.	  For	  him,	  a	  true	  explanation	  is	  a	  quasi-­‐perceptual	  perspicuous	  
overview2	   (übersichtliche	   Darstellung)	   of	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   phenomena,	   which	   shows	  
how	  part	  relates	  to	  part	  and	  how	  all	  the	  parts	  to	  the	  whole;	  in	  particular,	  how	  complex	  
and	  derived	   cases	   relate	   to	   the	  phenomenon	   in	   its	   simplest	   form	   (the	  Urphänomene).	  	  
To	  achieve	  this	  overview,	  writes	  Goethe,	  requires	  unremitting	  application,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  
standing	  temptation	  to	  substitute	  some	  more	  easily	  established	  abstract	  explanation	  for	  
the	  facts	  themselves.	  	  
2	   In	   the	  4th	  edition	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	   Investigations,	  Hacker	  and	  Schulte	   translate	  übersichtliche	  
Darstellung	   as	   “surveyable	   representation”.	   I	   prefer	   “perspicuous	   overview”	   because	   it	  makes	  
clear	  that	  the	  end	  of	  philosophy	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  psychological	  state	  of	  the	  reader	  or	  thinker	  
rather	  than	  something	  on	  the	  page.	  Of	  course,	  a	  clear	  method	  of	   laying	  out	   information	  on	  the	  
page	   is	   one	   way	   of	   helping	   someone	   to	   obtain	   a	   perspicuous	   overview	   of	   one	   branch	   of	  
knowledge.	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Wittgenstein	   explicitly	   applies	   Goethe’s	   account	   of	   scientific	   explanation	   to	   philo-­‐
sophical	   explanation.	   In	   the	   Investigations,	   using	   the	   poet’s	   own	   terminology,	   he	   ex-­‐
plains	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  perspicuous	  overview	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  
A	  main	  source	  of	  our	  failure	  to	  understand	  is	  that	  we	  don’t	  have	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  use	  of	  
our	  words.	  –	  Our	  grammar	  is	  deficient	  in	  surveyability.	  A	  perspicuous	  overview	  [übersichtli-­‐
che	   Darstellung]	   produces	   precisely	   that	   kind	   of	   understanding	   which	   consists	   in	   “seeing	  
connexions”.	  Hence	  the	  importance	  of	  finding	  and	  inventing	  intermediate	  links.	  
The	  concept	  of	  a	  perspicuous	  overview	  is	  of	  fundamental	  significance	  for	  us.	  It	  characterizes	  
the	  way	  we	  represent	  things,	  how	  we	  look	  at	  matters.	  […]	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  122)	  
Towards	   the	  end	  of	   the	  book’s	   first	   section,	  he	   then	  emphasizes	   the	   importance	  of	  
the	  Urphänomene	  and	  the	  temptation	  to	  substitute	  an	  abstract	  explanation	  for	  it:	  
Our	  mistake	   is	   to	   look	   for	   an	   explanation	  where	  we	   ought	   to	   regard	   the	   facts	   as	   “proto-­‐
phenomena”	   [Urphänomene].	   That	   is,	   where	   we	   ought	   to	   say:	   this	   is	   the	   language-­‐game	  
that	  is	  being	  played.	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  654)	  	  
Few	  people	  suppose	  that	  the	  end	  of	  poetry	  is	  a	  theory,	  and	  accordingly	  Wordsworth	  
never	  made	  an	  explicit	  pronouncement	  of	  this	  kind.	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  fascinating	  sec-­‐
tion	   in	  The	  Prelude’s	  seventh	  book,	  devoted	  to	  his	  stay	   in	  London,	  which	  suggests	  that	  
Wordsworth	  would	  have	  been	  very	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  account	  of	  understanding	  which	  
Goethe	  and	  Wittgenstein	  developed.	  Wordsworth	  has	  just	  described	  the	  endless	  multi-­‐
plicity	  of	  London’s	  St	  Bartholemew’s	  Fair,	  and	  comments:	  
Oh,	  blank	  confusion!	  true	  epitome	  
Of	  what	  the	  mighty	  City	  is	  herself,	  
To	  thousands	  upon	  thousands	  of	  her	  sons,	  
Living	  amid	  the	  perpetual	  whirl	  
Of	  trivial	  objects,	  melted	  and	  reduced	  	  
To	  one	  identity,	  by	  differences	  
That	  have	  no	  law,	  no	  meaning,	  and	  no	  end	  –	  	  
Oppression,	  under	  which	  even	  highest	  minds	  
Must	  labour,	  whence	  the	  strongest	  are	  not	  free.	  	  
[P:VII:722-­‐30]	  
However,	  he	  then	  describes	  how	  such	  a	  sight	  can	  be	  seen	  –	  how	  it	  ought	  to	  appear	  –	  
to	  the	  educated	  eye:	  
But	  though	  the	  picture	  weary	  out	  of	  the	  eye,	  
By	  nature	  an	  unmanageable	  sight,	  
It	  is	  not	  wholly	  so	  to	  him	  who	  looks	  
In	  steadiness,	  who	  hath	  among	  least	  things	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An	  under-­‐sense	  of	  greatness;	  sees	  the	  parts	  
As	  parts,	  but	  with	  a	  feeling	  of	  the	  whole.	  	  
[P:VII:731-­‐6]	  
This	  quasi-­‐perceptual	  ordering	  of	  what	  is	  seen,	  so	  that	  the	  contemplator	  can	  see	  how	  
each	  part	  relates	  to	  each	  part,	  and	  how	  all	  the	  parts	  relate	  to	  the	  whole,	  is	  exactly	  what	  
Goethe	  and	  Wittgenstein	  mean	  by	  a	  perspicuous	  overview.	  Wordsworth	  goes	  on	  to	  in-­‐
sist	   that	   this	   quasi-­‐visual	   ordering	   and	   understanding	   of	   phenomena	   is	   the	   most	   im-­‐
portant	   of	   all	   accomplishments	   (“of	   all	   acquisitions	   first”)	   and	   that	   acquisition	   of	   the	  
ability	  depends	  on	  childhood	  education,	  specifically	  moral	  education:	  	  	  
This,	  of	  all	  acquisitions	  first,	  awaits	  
On	  sundry	  and	  most	  different	  modes	  
Of	  education,	  nor	  with	  the	  least	  delight	  
On	  that	  through	  which	  I	  passed.	  Attention	  springs,	  
And	  comprehensiveness	  and	  memory	  flow,	  
From	  early	  converse	  with	  the	  works	  of	  God	  
Among	  all	  regions;	  chiefly	  where	  appear	  
Most	  obviously	  simplicity	  and	  power.	  	  
(Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  737-­‐44)	  
It	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  Wordsworth	  derived	  this	  idea	  from	  Goethe.	  It	  is	  more	  probable	  
that	  a	  similar	  outlook,	  and	  a	  similar	  set	  of	  priorities	  and	  preoccupations,	  led	  him	  to	  de-­‐
velop	  a	  closely	  related	  solution.	  	  	  
This	  understanding	  of	  the	  end	  of	  education,	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  how	  philosophy	  and	  po-­‐
etry	  might	  have	  a	  similar	  purpose	  and	  also	  how	  both	  may	  be	   linked	  to	  confession	  and	  
autobiography.	  «One	  cannot	  speak	  the	  truth’,	  writes	  Wittgenstein,	   	   ‘if	  one	  has	  not	  yet	  
conquered	   oneself»	   (Wittgenstein	   [1998]:	   41e),	   and	   a	   letter	   to	   Engelmann	   from	   1920	  
shows	  Wittgenstein	  mastering	  himself	  by	  acknowledging	  his	   faults	  and	  allowing	  a	  per-­‐
spicuous	  overview	  of	  his	  life	  to	  develop:	  
[…]	  I	  took	  down	  a	  kind	  of	  “confession”,	  in	  which	  I	  tried	  to	  recall	  the	  series	  of	  events	  in	  my	  life	  
in	  as	  much	  detail	  as	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  space	  of	  an	  hour.	  With	  each	  event	  I	  tried	  to	  make	  clear	  
to	  myself	  how	  I	  should	  have	  behaved.	  By	  means	  of	  such	  a	  perspicuous	  overview	  [Übersicht]	  
the	  confused	  picture	  was	  much	  simplified.	  The	  next	  day,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  newly	  gained	  in-­‐
sight,	  I	  revised	  my	  plans	  and	  intentions	  for	  the	  future.	  (Monk	  [1990]:	  180)	  
Self-­‐examination	  leads	  to	  confession,	  confession	  leads	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  per-­‐
spicuous	  overview,	  and	  the	  perspicuous	  overview	  leads	  to	  self-­‐overcoming.	  As	  philoso-­‐
phy	  for	  Wittgenstein	  is	  just	  a	  natural	  extension	  of	  this	  process	  («Work	  on	  philosophy	  […]	  
is	   really	  more	  work	   on	   oneself.	   On	   one’s	   own	   conception.	   On	   how	   one	   sees	   things»;	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Wittgenstein	   [1998]:	  16e),	   it	   is	  not	  surprising	   that	  his	   later	  philosophy	  should	  be	   influ-­‐
enced	  by	  St	  Augustine,	  and	  that	  the	  Investigations	  should	  recount	  so	  many	  temptations	  
surrendered	   to,	   resisted,	   analyzed	   and	   overcome:	   «[The	   book	   contains]	   the	   full	  
acknowledgement	  of	  temptation	  (“I	  want	  to	  say	  …”	  “I	  feel	  like	  saying	  …”	  “Here	  the	  urge	  
is	  strong	  …”)	  and	  a	  willingness	  to	  correct	  them	  and	  give	  them	  up	  (“In	  the	  everyday	  use	  
…”;	  “I	  impose	  a	  requirement	  which	  does	  not	  meet	  my	  real	  need”)»	  (Cavell	  [1976]:	  71).	  
These	  considerations	  mean,	  of	  course,	  that	  there	  is	  an	  element	  of	  autobiography	  in	  
philosophy,	   since	   confession	   requires	   us	   to	   look	   over	   our	   lives	   and	   acknowledge	   our	  
temptations.	  This	  insight,	  in	  its	  turn,	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  that	  a	  long	  autobiographical	  poem,	  
might	  allow	  the	  poet	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  his	  development,	  and	  to	  see	  the	  structure	  of	  his	  
own	   life	  more	  clearly.	  The	  aims	  of	   the	  The	  Prelude	  and	  the	   Investigations	  are	  thus	  not	  
that	  remote	  from	  one	  another;	  and	   it’s	  also	  worth	  noticing	  how	  much	  of	  what	  Words-­‐
worth	  writes	  about	  in	  the	  opening	  books	  is	  to	  do	  with	  fear	  and	  guilt,	  and	  how	  many	  of	  
the	  activities	  –	  removing	  animals	  from	  other	  men’s	  traps	  (Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  301-­‐25),	  
purloining	   birds’	   eggs	   (Wordsworth	   [1954]:	   326-­‐39),	   stealing	   a	   boat	   	   (Wordsworth	  
[1954]:	  357-­‐400)	  –	  are	   immoral	  or	   illegal.	  The	  Prelude	   itself	   is,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  a	  
confession.	  	  
Wordsworth	   and	  Wittgenstein’s	   respect	   for	   and	   interest	   in	   children	   consorts	   easily	  
with	  an	   interest	   in	  ordinary	  humanity	  –	  with	  peasants,	   the	  unlettered,	   the	  unsophisti-­‐
cated	  –	  and	  it	  is	  the	  urban,	  refined,	  and	  those	  who	  have	  thought	  too	  much	  who	  are	  the	  
objects	  of	   suspicion.	   It	   is	   the	   latter	  group,	  each	  writer	   feels,	  who	  have	  perverted	   their	  
own	  tastes,	  acquired	  a	  false	  understanding	  of	  themselves,	  and	  allowed	  both	  vices	  to	  be-­‐
come	  ossified	  through	  unthinking	  self-­‐confidence.	  One	  purpose	  of	  Wordsworth’s	  poetry	  
is	   to	   break	   through	   this	   crust	   and	   ensure	   the	   hardened	   cosmopolitan	   is	  weaned	  off	   a	  
false	  taste	  for	   life	   in	  towns	  and	  «frantic	  novels,	   [and]	  sickly,	  and	  stupid	  German	  Trage-­‐
dies»	   (Wordsworth	   [1984]:	   599)	   so	   that	   he	   is	   once	   again	   capable	   of	   feeling	   genuine	  
emotion.	  False	  taste	  also	  prevents	  the	  accurate	  observation	  of	  nature:	  	  
Now	   it	   is	   remarkable	   that,	  excepting	  a	  passage	  or	   two	   in	   the	  Windsor	  Forest	  of	  Pope,	  and	  
some	  delightful	  passages	   in	  the	  poems	  of	  Lady	  Winchelsea,	   the	  Poetry	  of	   the	  period	   inter-­‐
vening	  between	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Paradise	  Lost	  and	  the	  Seasons	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  sin-­‐
gle	  new	  image	  of	  external	  nature;	  and	  scarcely	  presents	  a	  familiar	  one	  from	  which	  it	  can	  be	  
inferred	  that	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  Poet	  had	  been	  steadily	  fixed	  upon	  his	  object	  […].	  A	  blind	  man,	  in	  
the	   habit	   of	   attending	   attentively	   to	   descriptions	   casually	   dropped	   from	   the	   lips	   of	   those	  
around	  him,	  might	   easily	   depict	   these	   appearances	  with	  more	   truth.	   (Wordsworth	   [1984]:	  
651)	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Similarly,	   one	   of	  Wittgenstein’s	   purposes	   is	   to	   dissolve	   pre-­‐conceived	   ideas,	   those	  	  
«to	  which	  reality	  must	  correspond.	  (The	  dogmatism	  into	  which	  we	  fall	  so	  easily	  in	  doing	  
philosophy)»	   (Wittgenstein	   [2009]:	   131),	   and	   turn	   attention	   away	   from	   the	   world	   of	  
false	   idealizations	   to	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   the	   perceptual	   world	   around	   us:	   «Don’t	   say:	  
“They	  must	  have	  something	  common,	  or	  they	  would	  not	  be	  called	   ‘games’”	  –	  but	   look	  
and	  see	  whether	  there	  is	  anything	  common	  to	  all	  […]	  To	  repeat:	  don’t	  think,	  but	  look!»	  
(Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  66).	  
Both	  writers	   see	  a	   certain	   falsity	  of	   language	  as	  both	  a	   cause	  and	   symptom	  of	   this	  
blindness.	  Wordsworth	  is	  deeply	  critical	  of	  “poetic	  diction”	  and	  personified	  abstract	  ide-­‐
as	   (Wordsworth	   [1984]:	  595-­‐603);	  Wittgenstein	   inveighs	  against	  philosophical	   theories	  
and	  their	  deadening	  technical	  terms	  in	  notably	  Wordsworthian	  language:	  «The	  language	  
used	  by	  philosophers	  is	  already	  deformed,	  as	  though	  by	  shoes	  that	  are	  too	  tight»	  (Witt-­‐
genstein	  [1998]:	  47e);	  «Don’t	  let	  yourself	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  example	  of	  others,	  but	  by	  na-­‐
ture!»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  47e).	  Wittgenstein	  certainly	  acknowledges	  that	  he	  himself	  
is	  subject	  to	  the	  fantasies	  and	  misunderstandings	  he	  criticizes	  in	  others	  («Nothing	  is	  so	  
difficult	  as	  not	  deceiving	  yourself»;	  Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  39);	  and	  Wordsworth	  too	  tacit-­‐
ly	  acknowledges	   that	  he	   is	  not	  always	  «worthy	  of	  himself»	   (Wordsworth	   [1954]:	  350),	  
and	   that	   «the	   burthen	   of	   my	   own	   unnatural	   self»	   (Wordsworth	   [1954]:	   21)	   must	   be	  
worked	  through	  and	  slowly	  discarded.	  
Given	  this	  shared	  outlook,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  both	  writers	  should	  have	  been	  at-­‐
tracted	   by	   an	   interest	   in	   equality	   and	   the	   more	   left-­‐wing	   politics	   of	   their	   day:	   the	  
Wordsworth	  who	  wrote	  the	  first	  two	  versions	  of	  The	  Prelude	  was	  drawn	  by	  the	  ideals	  of	  
the	  French	  Revolution	  and	  Radicalism;	  in	  the	  1930s,	  Wittgenstein	  expressed	  enthusiasm	  
for	  Soviet	  Russia	  and	  was	  drawn	  to	  Communism.	  Rather	  less	  predictable,	  given	  their	  po-­‐
litical	  views,	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  both	  had	  a	  highly	  unconventional	  belief	  in	  God,	  and,	  
in	  very	  different	  ways,	  believed	  in	  the	  mystical.	  	  
A	  further	  symptom	  of	  the	  two	  writers’	  fundamental	  affinity,	  and	  their	  joint	  interest	  in	  
both	  children	  and	  the	  unsophisticated,	  is	  their	  shared	  enthusiasm	  for	  folk	  tales	  and	  fairy	  
stories.	  Fania	  Pascal	  recalls	  Wittgenstein	  picking	  up	  a	  copy	  of	  Grimms’	  tales	  and	  	  -­‐	  after	  
reading	  the	  lines	  «Ach,	  wie	  gut	  ist	  dass	  niemand	  weiss	  /	  Dass	  ich	  Rumpelstilzchen	  heiss,»	  
–	  muttering	  «Profound,	  profound».	  «To	  watch	  him	  in	  a	  state	  of	  hushed,	  silent	  awe»,	  she	  
continues,	   «as	   though	   looking	   far	   beyond	  what	   oneself	   could	   see,	  was	   an	   experience	  
next	  only	  to	  hearing	  him	  talk»	  (Pascal	  [1984]:	  20).	  	  
We	  can	  see	  the	  same	  enthusiasm	  displayed	  in	  the	  value	  he	  placed	  on	  Tolstoy’s	  folk	  
tales	  (such	  as	  “How	  much	  land	  does	  a	  man	  need?”)	  and	  in	  frequent	  references	  to	  fairy	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stories	  and	  fables	  in	  his	  philosophical	  work.	  Folk	  tales	  are	  mentioned	  twice	  in	  the	  Inves-­‐
tigations:	   «“But	   in	   a	   fairy	   tale	   a	  pot	   too	   can	   see	   and	  hear!”	   (Certainly;	   but	   it	   can	   also	  
talk)»	   (Wittgenstein	   [2009]:	   282);	   «Thinking	   is	   not	   an	   incorporeal	   process	  which	   lends	  
life	  and	  sense	  to	  speaking,	  and	  which	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  detach	  from	  speaking,	  ra-­‐
ther	  as	  the	  Devil	  took	  the	  shadow	  of	  	  Schlemihl	  from	  the	  ground»	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  
339)	  –	  a	  reference	  to	  Adelbert	  von	  Chamisso’s	  story	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  255).	   In	  Cul-­‐
ture	  and	  Value,	   he	   suggests	   a	  more	  general	   and	   important	   connection:	  «Compare	   the	  
solution	  of	  philosophical	  problems	  with	  the	  fairy	  tale	  gift	  that	  seems	  magical	  in	  the	  en-­‐
chanted	  castle	  and	  if	  it	  is	  looked	  at	  in	  daylight	  is	  nothing	  but	  an	  ordinary	  bit	  of	  iron	  (or	  
something	  of	  the	  sort)»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  13-­‐14e).	  	  
Wordsworth	  describes	  the	  impact	  of	  folk	  tales	  on	  his	  younger	  self	  in	  a	  passage	  from	  
The	  Pedlar,	  which	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  an	  early	  third-­‐person	  sketch	  of	  The	  Prelude:	  	  	  	  
The	  life	  and	  death	  of	  martyrs	  who	  sustained	  
Intolerable	  pangs,	  and	  here	  and	  there	  
A	  straggling	  volume,	  torn	  and	  incomplete,	  
Which	  left	  half-­‐told	  the	  preternatural	  tale,	  
Romance	  of	  giants,	  chronicle	  of	  fiends,	  
Profuse	  in	  garniture	  of	  wooden	  cuts	  
Strange	  and	  uncouth,	  dire	  faces,	  figures	  dire,	  
Sharp-­‐kneed,	  sharp-­‐elbowed,	  and	  lean	  ankled	  too,	  
With	  long	  and	  ghostly	  shanks,	  forms	  which	  once	  seen	  
Could	  never	  be	  forgotten	  –	  things	  though	  low,	  
Though	  low	  and	  humble,	  not	  to	  be	  despised	  
By	  such	  as	  have	  observed	  the	  curious	  links	  
With	  which	  the	  perishable	  hours	  of	  life	  
Are	  bound	  together,	  and	  the	  world	  of	  thought	  
Exists	  and	  is	  sustained.	  
(Wordsworth	  [1985]:	  22)	  
The	   same	   set	   of	   interests	  which	   animated	  Wordsworth	   prompted	  German	   philolo-­‐
gists	   in	  the	  early	  Romantic	  period	  to	   look	  systematically	  at	   folklore	  and	  folktales	  –	  Das	  
Knaben	  Wunderhorn	  and	  Grimm’s	  Fairy	  Tales	  are	   two	  notable	  expressions	  of	   these	   in-­‐
terests	  –	  and	  it	  is	  the	  work	  of	  these	  men	  which	  later	  fed	  Wittgenstein’s	  imagination.	  	  	  
The	  section	  about	  folk	  tales	  in	  The	  Pedlar	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  passages	  in	  Wordsworth	  
to	  do	  with	  his	  childhood	  reading,	  and	  –	  even	  though	  he	   is	  a	  poet	  –	  he	   is	  generally	  op-­‐
posed	   to	  books	  and	  book	   learning	   (unlike	  his	   friend	  –	   the	  «library	   cormorant»	  –	  Cole-­‐
ridge).	   	   In	   the	  poem	  Expostulation	  and	  Reply,	  Wordsworth	   imagines	  being	  chided	  by	  a	  
friend	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	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Where	  are	  your	  books?	  That	  light	  bequeathed	  
To	  beings	  else	  forlorn	  and	  blind!	  
Up!	  Up!	  And	  breathed	  
From	  dead	  men	  to	  their	  kind.	  
Wordsworth	  replies:	  
Books!	  ‘tis	  a	  dull	  and	  endless	  strife,	  
Come	  hear	  the	  woodland	  linnet,	  
How	  sweet	  his	  music	  on	  my	  life	  
There’s	  more	  of	  wisdom	  in	  it.	  
……..	  
One	  impulse	  from	  a	  vernal	  wood	  
May	  teach	  you	  more	  of	  man;	  
Of	  moral	  evil	  and	  of	  good,	  
Than	  all	  the	  sages	  can.	  
(Wordsworth	  [1984]:129-­‐131)	  
In	   the	   later	  Wittgenstein,	  we	   find	  exactly	   the	   same	  suspicion	  of	  book-­‐learning,	   and	  
the	  Investigations	  is	  remarkably	  free	  of	  footnotes	  and	  references	  to	  other	  works	  of	  phi-­‐
losophy.	  Like	  the	  rural	  vicars	  from	  whom	  the	  young	  Wordsworth	  borrowed	  books,	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  had	  a	  very	  limited	  library	  –	  only	  the	  works	  of	  St	  Augustine,	  Lewis	  Carroll,	  Frege	  ,	  
William	   James,	  Moore,	   Plato	   and	   Russell	   are	  mentioned	  more	   than	   once	   in	   the	  main	  
body	  of	  the	  Investigations	  –	  but	  the	  books	  it	  contained	  were	  much	  consulted,	  meditated	  
upon,	   and	  endorsed	  by	   the	  passage	  of	   time.	  Wittgenstein,	   like	  Wordsworth,	  was	   con-­‐
vinced	  that	  truth	  was	  to	  be	  discovered	  amongst	  the	  practice	  of	  ordinary	  people,	  and	  the	  
written	   thoughts	   of	   the	   sophisticated	  were	   often	   of	   interest	   only	   insofar	   as	   they	   pre-­‐
sented	  particularly	  clear	  cases	  of	  intellectual	  error.	  
Wittgenstein	   is	   characteristically	   Romantic	   in	   refusing	   to	   distinguish	   between	   style	  
and	  content.	  The	  basic	  unit	  of	  his	  thought	  is	  not	  the	  idea,	  conception	  or	  argument,	  but	  
the	  remark	  or	  sentence:	  
What	  looks	  like	  a	  bad	  sentence	  can	  be	  the	  germ	  of	  a	  good	  one.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  67e)	  
If	  I	  had	  written	  a	  good	  sentence,	  &	  they	  were	  by	  accident	  two	  rhyming	  lines,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  
blemish.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  66e)	  
Sometimes	  a	  sentence	  can	  be	  understood	  only	  if	  it	  is	  read	  at	  the	  right	  tempo.	  My	  sentences	  
are	  all	  to	  be	  read	  slowly.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  65e)	  
On	  this	  conception,	  a	  paraphrase	  of	  a	  philosopher’s	  sentences	  no	  more	  captures	  the	  
character	   and	   value	   of	   a	   philosopher’s	  work	   than	   a	   paraphrase	   of	   a	   poet’s	   sentences	  
captures	  the	  value	  and	  character	  of	  his	  poetry.	  This,	  indeed,	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	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behind	  Wittgenstein’s	  remark,	  «really	  one	  should	  write	  philosophy	  only	  as	  one	  writes	  a	  
poem»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  28e).	  
This	  aesthetic	  notion	  of	  philosophy’s	  relation	  to	  language,	  however,	  is	  reinforced	  and	  
underpinned	  by	  an	  extremely	  strenuous	  and	  deeply	  Romantic	  conception	  of	  genius	  and	  
originality.	  To	  conform	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  notion	  of	  originality,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  merely	  to	  
express	  an	  important	  idea	  that	  no	  one	  has	  thought	  of	  before,	  one	  must	  also	  express	  an	  
important	  idea	  in	  sentences	  which	  embody	  one’s	  whole	  character:	  
Genius	   is	   talent	   in	  which	  character	  makes	   itself	  heard.	  For	  that	  reason,	   I	  would	   like	  to	  say,	  
Kraus	   has	   talent,	   an	   extraordinary	   talent,	   but	   not	   genius.	   [In	   some	   of	   Lichtenberg’s	   apho-­‐
risms]	  you	  see	  not	  merely	  an	  intellectual	  skeleton,	  but	  a	  whole	  human	  being.	  
That	   is	   the	   reason	   too	  why	   the	  greatness	  of	  what	   someone	  writes	  depends	  on	  everything	  
else	  he	  writes	  &	  does.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  75e)	  
Naturally	  enough,	  Wittgenstein	  agonized	  about	  whether	  he	  had	  such	  originality	  him-­‐
self	   (and	   then	  goes	  on	   to	  agonize	  about	  whether	   this	   remark	  about	  originality	   is	   itself	  
sufficiently	  original):	  
I	  cannot	  judge	  whether	  I	  have	  only	  taste,	  or	  originality	  as	  well.	  The	  former	  I	  can	  see	  distinct-­‐
ly,	  but	  not	  the	  latter,	  or	  only	  quite	  indistinctly.	  And	  perhaps	  it	  has	  to	  be	  like	  that,	  &	  you	  see	  
only	  what	  you	  have,	  not	  what	  you	  are.	  Someone	  who	  does	  not	  lie	  is	  original	  enough.	  For,	  af-­‐
ter	  all,	  the	  originality	  that	  would	  be	  worth	  wishing	  for,	  cannot	  be	  a	  sort	  of	  trick,	  or	  an	  idio-­‐
syncrasy,	  however	  marked.	  
In	  fact	  it	  is	  already	  a	  seed	  of	  good	  originality	  not	  to	  want	  to	  be	  what	  you	  are	  not.	  And	  all	  that	  
has	  been	  said	  before	  much	  better	  by	  others.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  68e)	  
Given	  his	  conception	  of	  originality,	  it	  is	  highly	  important	  that	  each	  sentence	  express-­‐
es	  his	  whole	  person,	  and	  he	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  any	  sentence	  which	  does	  not	  
do	  this.	  As	  he	  says	  in	  the	  Preface	  to	  the	  Investigations:	  
For	  more	  than	  one	  reason,	  what	  I	  publish	  here	  will	  have	  points	  of	  contact	  with	  what	  other	  
people	  are	  writing	  today.	  –	  If	  my	  remarks	  do	  not	  bear	  a	  stamp	  which	  marks	  them	  as	  mine,	  
then	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  lay	  any	  further	  claim	  to	  them	  as	  my	  property.	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  4e)	  
The	  aesthetic	  and	  expressive	  reasons	  described	  above	   for	   the	   impossibility	  of	  para-­‐
phrase	  could	  come	  apart:	  one	  could,	   for	  example,	  believe	   that	  poetic	  value	  cannot	  be	  
captured	   in	  paraphrase	  even	   if	  one	  holds	  a	  completely	   formalist	  conception	  of	  poetry;	  
and	  one	  could	  think	  that	  every	   idea	  or	  argument	  (however	  they	  are	  expressed)	  should	  
uniquely	  embody	  the	  originator’s	  whole	  personality.	  But	  when	  taken	  together,	  one	  can	  
understand	  why	  Wittgenstein	   so	   hated	  his	   ideas	   being	   expounded	  by	   others	   and	  why	  
indeed	  that	  he	  thought	  such	  appropriation	  was	  in	  fact	  impossible.	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If	  you	  believe	  in	  the	  aesthetic	  reason	  for	  the	  impossibility	  of	  paraphrase	  then	  another	  
expositor	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	   ideas	  can	  only	  quote	  his	  sentences	  with	  or	  without	  attribu-­‐
tion.	  If	  the	  expositor	  quotes	  them	  with	  an	  attribution	  then	  the	  expositor	  has	  not	  played	  
any	  role	  in	  the	  sentences	  at	  all;	  if	  he	  quotes	  them	  without	  attribution	  then	  his	  work	  can	  
only	  be	  deeply	  dishonest.	  If	  you	  believe	  in	  the	  expressive	  reason	  for	  the	  impossibility	  of	  
appropriation,	  then	  any	  idea	  of	  Wittgenstein’s,	  when	  used	  by	  an	  expositor,	  will	  still	  bear	  
Wittgenstein’s	  unique	  stamp.	  It	  can	  therefore	  either	  be	  an	  idea	  of	  Wittgenstein’s,	  or	  an	  
exact	  imitation	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  thought	  –	  something	  Wittgenstein	  can	  only	  have	  found	  
artificial,	  grotesque	  and	  inauthentic.	  As	  both	  reasons	  function	  together	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  
outlook,	   any	   appropriation	   of	   his	   remarks	   by	   others	   can	   only	   be	   dishonest	   and	   gro-­‐
tesque.	  	  	  
As	  he	  has	   such	  a	   strenuous	   conception	  of	  originality,	   it	   is	  not	   surprising	  he	  holds	  a	  
low	  and	  disparaging	   conception	  of	   influence.	  Given	  his	   tendency	   to	  use	  organic	  meta-­‐
phors	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  context,	  it	  would	  seem	  natural	  for	  him	  to	  think	  of	  influence	  as	  the	  
modification	  of	   inherited	   characteristics,	   or	   grafting,	   or	   retraining	   and	  guiding	   a	  plant.	  
But	   instead	  of	   these	   images,	   he	   can	  only	   think	  of	   influence	   in	   terms	  of	   dead	  matter	   -­‐	  
shriveled	  husks	  and	  egg	  shells	  -­‐	  which	  still	  cling	  to	  the	  living	  being:	  	  
It’s	  a	  good	  thing	  I	  don’t	  let	  myself	  be	  influenced!	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  3e)	  
My	  thinking,	   like	  everyone	  else’s,	  has	  sticking	   to	   it	   the	  shriveled	  husks	  of	  my	  earlier	   (with-­‐
ered)	  thoughts.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  27e)	  
Every	   artist	   has	   been	   influenced	   by	   others	   &	   shows	   (the)	   traces	   of	   that	   influence	   in	   his	  
works;	  but	  what	  we	  get	  from	  him	  is	  all	  the	  same	  only	  his	  own	  personality.	  What	  is	  inherited	  
from	  others	  can	  be	  nothing	  but	  egg	  shells.	  We	  should	  treat	  the	  fact	  of	  their	  presence	  with	  
indulgence	  but	  they	  will	  not	  give	  us	  Spiritual	  nourishment.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  27e)	  
It	  will	  be	  hard	  to	  follow	  my	  portrayal:	  for	  it	  says	  something	  new,	  but	  still	  has	  egg-­‐shells	  of	  the	  
old	  material	  sticking	  to	  it.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  51e)	  
Wittgenstein	  places	  great	  stress	  on	  the	  spontaneity	  of	  ideas	  –	  like	  Shelley	  and	  several	  
other	  Romantic	  theorists	  -­‐	  and	  finds	  an	  inadequate	  but	  fresh	  idea	  superior	  to	  a	  correct	  
but	  conventional	  revision.	  Again,	  the	  revision	  is	  just	  described	  as	  a	  form	  of	  dead	  matter:	  
A	  mediocre	  writer	  must	   be	   beware	   of	   too	   quickly	   replacing	   a	   crude,	   incorrect	   expression	  
with	  a	  correct	  one.	  By	  doing	  so	  he	  kills	  the	  original	  idea,	  which	  was	  still	  at	  least	  a	  living	  seed-­‐
ling.	  And	  now	  it	  is	  shriveled	  &	  no	  longer	  worth	  anything.	  He	  may	  now	  just	  as	  well	  throw	  it	  on	  
the	   rubbish	  heap.	  Whereas	   the	  pitiful	   seedling	   still	  had	  a	  certain	  usefulness.	   (Wittgenstein	  
[1998]:	  90e)	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2.	  Both	  the	  Investigations	  and	  Kubla	  Khan	  have	  prefaces,	  but,	  in	  a	  sense,	  The	  Prelude	  has	  
two.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  initial	  269	  lines	  of	  the	  1805	  and	  1850	  versions.	  These	  lines	  describe	  
Wordsworth’s	  journey	  from	  London	  and	  his	  difficulties	  with	  poetic	  inspiration,	  before	  he	  
begins	  on	  the	  account	  of	  his	  childhood	  which	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  poem	  proper.	  
The	  second	  is	  the	  two	  paragraphs	  about	  the	  The	  Prelude	  which	  he	  included	  in	  his	  pref-­‐
ace	  to	  The	  Excursion3.	  The	  latter	  work	  was	  published	  in	  1814,	  thirty-­‐six	  years	  before	  The	  
Prelude	  itself.	  
What	  similarities	  can	  we	  find	  between	  the	  three	  works’	  prefaces?	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  
poetic	  preface	  to	  The	  Prelude	  and	  the	  Investigations’	  preface	  both	  tell	  us	  that	  their	  au-­‐
thors	  tried	  to	  write	  a	  conventional	  work.	  	  
In	  the	  opening	  pages	  of	  The	  Prelude,	  Wordsworth	  reports	  that	  he	  leaves	  London	  full	  
of	  a	  sense	  of	  freedom	  and	  creativity,	  but	  soon	  finds	  his	  inspiration	  becomes	  intermittent	  
and	  troublesome:	  	  
It	  was	  a	  splendid	  evening,	  and	  my	  soul	  
Once	  more	  made	  trial	  of	  her	  strength,	  nor	  lacked	  	  
Aeolian	  visitations;	  but	  the	  harp	  
Was	  soon	  defrauded,	  and	  the	  banded	  host	  
Of	  harmony	  dispersed	  in	  straggling	  sounds,	  
And	  lastly	  utter	  silence!	  	  
(Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  94-­‐99)	  
The	  Poet,	  gentle	  creature	  as	  he	  is,	  
Hath,	  like	  the	  Lover,	  his	  unruly	  times;	  
His	  fits	  when	  he	  is	  neither	  sick	  nor	  well,	  
Though	  no	  distress	  be	  near	  him	  but	  his	  own	  
Unmanageable	  thoughts.	  
(Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  135-­‐39)	  
He	  then	  sets	  himself	  sternly	  to	  the	  task	  of	  writing	  a	  traditional	  epic,	  and	  he	  tries	  and	  
rejects	  the	  following	  topics:	  King	  Arthur,	  Mithridates,	  Sertorius,	  an	  as	  yet	  unsung	  high-­‐
souled	  man,	  Dominique	  de	  Gourges,	  Gustavus	  I	  of	  Sweden,	  William	  Wallace,	  and	  some	  
fictional	  story	  of	  his	  own	  [P:I:	  169-­‐227].	  He	  then	  returns	  to	  a	  topic	  which	  has	  attracted	  
him	  for	  years:	  	  
Then	  a	  wish	  
My	  best	  and	  favourite	  aspiration,	  mounts	  
With	  yearning	  toward	  some	  philosophic	  song	  	  
3	   The	   Excursion,	   in	  William	   Wordsworth:	   The	   Poems,	   Volume	   Two	   (ed.)	   John	   O.Hayden	   (Har-­‐
mondsworth:	  Penguin,	  1977),	  pp.	  35-­‐7.	  Hereafter	  “E”.	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Of	  Truth	  that	  cherishes	  our	  daily	  life	  
(Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  227-­‐230)	  
But	  from	  this	  awful	  burthen	  I	  full	  soon	  
Take	  refuge	  and	  beguile	  myself	  with	  trust	  
That	  mellower	  years	  will	  bring	  a	  riper	  mind	  
And	  clearer	  insight.	  Thus	  my	  days	  are	  past	  
In	  contradiction	  	  
(Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  234-­‐7)	  
This	  is	  my	  lot;	  for	  either	  still	  I	  find	  
Some	  imperfection	  in	  the	  chosen	  theme,	  
Or	  see	  of	  absolute	  accomplishment	  
Much	  wanting,	  so	  much	  wanting,	  in	  myself,	  
That	  I	  recoil	  and	  droop,	  and	  seek	  repose	  
In	  listlessness	  from	  vain	  perplexity,	  
Unprofitably	  travelling	  toward	  the	  grave,	  
Like	  a	  false	  steward	  who	  hath	  much	  received	  
And	  renders	  nothing	  back	  	  
(Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  261-­‐9)	  
Finally,	  in	  frustration	  and	  despair,	  he	  asks	  how	  it	  can	  be	  that	  every	  moment	  of	  his	  life	  
seemed	  to	  be	  preparing	  him	  for	  this	  task,	  and	  yet	  he	  finds	  himself	  incapable	  of	  tackling	  
it:	  
Was	  it	  for	  this	  
That	  one,	  the	  fairest	  of	  all	  rivers,	  loved	  
To	  blend	  his	  murmurs	  with	  my	  nurse’s	  song,	  
And,	  from	  his	  alder	  shades	  and	  rocky	  falls	  
And	  from	  his	  fords	  and	  shallows,	  sent	  a	  voice	  	  
That	  flowed	  along	  my	  dream?	  For	  this,	  didst	  thou,	  
O	  Derwent!	  Winding	  among	  grassy	  holms	  
Where	  I	  was	  looking	  on,	  a	  babe	  in	  arms,	  
Making	  ceaseless	  music	  that	  composed	  my	  thoughts	  
To	  more	  than	  infant	  softness,	  giving	  me,	  
Amid	  the	  fretful	  dwellings	  of	  mankind	  
A	  foretaste,	  a	  dim	  earnest,	  of	  the	  calm	  
That	  Nature	  breathes	  among	  the	  hills	  and	  groves	  	  
(Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  269-­‐81)	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And	  suddenly	  we	  realize,	  and	  he	  realizes	  too,	  that	  he	  has	  found	  his	  theme4.	  It	  is	  the	  
very	  moment	  he	  gives	  up,	  the	  very	  moment	  he	  stops	  trying,	  that	  inspiration	  is	  released:	  
the	  verse,	  which	  up	  to	  this	  point	  has	  been	  crabbed,	  dry	  and	  conventional,	  suddenly	  be-­‐
comes	  supple	  and	  flexible,	  the	  images	  begin	  to	  intermingle	  and	  divide,	  his	  epic	  begins	  to	  
flow	   unstoppably.	   A	   cry	   of	   despair	   at	   being	   unable	   to	  write	   a	   great	   poem	   begins	   the	  
great	  poem	  itself:	   it	   is	  almost	  as	   if	  his	  subject	  matter	  –	  his	  own	  rural	  boyhood	  –	  stood	  
too	  close	  for	  him	  to	  see	  it	  clearly,	  and	  he	  is	  startled	  and	  amazed	  at	  its	  immediacy.	  	  
Wittgenstein	  too	  spent	  years	  wrestling	  with	  his	  own	  ‘unmanageable	  thoughts’.	  In	  the	  
preface	  to	  the	  Investigations,	  he	  writes:	  
Originally	  it	  was	  my	  intention	  to	  bring	  [my	  major	  preoccupations]	  together	  in	  a	  book	  whose	  
form	  whose	  form	  I	   thought	  of	  differently	  at	  different	  times.	  But	   it	  seemed	  to	  me	  essential	  
that	   in	   the	   book	   the	   thoughts	   should	   proceed	   from	   one	   subject	   to	   another	   in	   a	   natural,	  
smooth	  sequence.	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  3e)	  
But	  he	  eventually	  had	  to	  concede	  that	  this	  was	  not	  going	  to	  happen:	  	  
After	  several	  unsuccessful	  attempts	  to	  weld	  my	  thoughts	  together	  into	  such	  a	  whole,	  I	  real-­‐
ized	  that	  I	  should	  never	  succeed.	  The	  best	  that	  I	  could	  write	  would	  never	  be	  more	  than	  phil-­‐
osophical	  remarks;	  my	  thoughts	  soon	  grew	  feeble	  if	  I	  tried	  to	  force	  them	  along	  a	  single	  track	  
against	  their	  inclination.	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  3e)	  
If	  Wordsworth	  knew	  the	  form	  he	  wanted	  but	  couldn’t	  find	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  content,	  
then	  Wittgenstein	  had	  the	  content	  but	  couldn’t	  find	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  form.	  In	  the	  Blue	  
Book,	   he	   tried	  writing	  out	   his	   thoughts	   in	   straightforward	   expository	   prose	   and	   found	  
this	  unsatisfactory	   (it	   is	   interesting	   that	  Wittgenstein	  preferred	   to	  dictate	  his	  work;	  he	  
liked	  to	  keep	  written	  prose	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  human	  voice	  –	  hence	  his	  interest	  
in	  Plato’s	  dialogues	  and	  the	  largely	  oral	  culture	  captured	  in	  the	  Grimms’	  fairy	  tales.	  Beth	  
Savickey	   has	   also	   pointed	   out	   to	  me	   that	   he	  was	   told	   about	  many	  works	  which	   influ-­‐
enced	  him,	   rather	   than	   reading	   them	  directly.	   	  He	   then	   tried	  out	   the	   crabbed	  puzzles	  
and	   dry	   gnomic	   parables	   of	   the	   Brown	   Book,	   but	   again	   found	   the	   final	   product	   off-­‐
putting.	   Between	   and	   after	   these	   attempts,	   he	   seems	   to	   have	   felt	   exhausted,	   utterly	  
demoralized,	  and	  full	  of	  despair	  at	   the	  thought	  that	  he	  might	  never	  be	  able	  to	  write	  a	  
book:	  «I	  squander	  untold	  effort	  making	  an	  arrangement	  of	  my	  thoughts	  that	  may	  have	  
no	  value	  whatsoever»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  33e);	  «I	  am	  now	  writing	  my	  book,	  or	  trying	  
to	  write	  it,	  and	  write	  bit	  by	  bit	  and	  without	  any	  progress;	  from	  hand	  to	  mouth.	  It	  is	  im-­‐	  
4	  This	   literary	  effect	  can	  only	  be	   found	   in	   the	  1805	  and	  1850	  versions	  of	   the	  poem.	  He	  did	  not	  
bother	  to	  write	  up	  his	  struggle	  with	  inspiration	  in	  the	  1799	  version	  which	  begins	  at	  line	  269	  of	  the	  
later	  texts.	  See	  The	  Pedlar,	  Tintern	  Abbey,	  and	  Two-­‐part	  Prelude,	  p.	  41.	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possible	   that	   like	   this	   something	   good	  will	   come	  out	  of	   it»	   (Gilmore	   [1990]:	   193-­‐194);	  
«The	   remarks	   which	   I	   write	   enable	   me	   to	   teach	   philosophy	   well,	   but	   not	   to	   write	   a	  
book»	  (Gilmore	  [1990]:	  193-­‐194).	  
Initially,	  Wittgenstein	  thought	  his	  way	  of	  jumping	  around	  a	  topic	  was	  just	  an	  unsatis-­‐
factory	  feature	  of	  his	  own	  thought:	  
If	  I	  am	  thinking	  just	  for	  myself	  without	  wanting	  to	  write	  a	  book,	  I	   jump	  about	  all	  round	  the	  
topic:	   that	   is	   the	  only	  way	   that	   is	   natural	   to	  me.	   Forcing	  my	   thoughts	   into	   an	  ordered	   se-­‐
quence	  is	  a	  torment	  for	  me.	  Should	  I	  even	  attempt	  it	  now?	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  33e)	  	  
He	  also	  thinks	  it	  might	  be	  as	  well	  to	  give	  up	  trying	  to	  write	  a	  book	  and	  just	  jot	  down	  
miscellaneous	  remarks	  which	  could	  be	  published	  after	  his	  death:	  
I	  am	  above	  all	  much	  too	  uneasy,	  much	  too	  constrained	  in	  my	  writing.	  If	  I	  were	  to	  write	  like	  
this,	  then	   it	   is	  better	  to	  write	  no	  book,	  but	  rather	  to	  restrict	  myself	  here	  after	  a	  fashion	  to	  
writing	   remarks	  which	   are	   still	   perhaps	   to	   be	   published	   after	  my	   death?	   (Gilmore	   [1990]:	  
193-­‐194)	  
He	  needed	  three	  insights	  before	  he	  could	  make	  progress.	  First,	  he	  needed	  to	  see	  that	  
his	  way	  of	  jumping	  around	  a	  topic	  was	  not	  a	  fault	  of	  his	  own	  thinking-­‐style,	  and	  that	  it	  
was	  connected	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  method	  and	  his	  subject	  matter.	  Second,	  two	  favour-­‐
ite	  metaphors	  needed	  to	  coalesce:	  
To	   piece	   together	   the	   landscape	   of	   these	   conceptual	   relationships	   out	   of	   their	   individual	  
fragments	   is	   too	  difficult	   for	  me.	   I	   can	  only	  make	  a	   very	   imperfect	   job	  of	   it.	   (Wittgenstein	  
[1998]:	  90e)	  
And	   what	   I	   basically	   am	   after	   all	   is	   a	   painter,	   &	   often	   a	   very	   bad	   painter.	   (Wittgenstein	  
[1998]:	  95e)	  
In	   isolation,	  these	  remarks	  can	  sound	  unrelated	  and	  dismally	  downbeat.	  Putting	  to-­‐
gether	  a	  landscape	  sounds	  like	  a	  truly	  Herculean	  task	  (no	  wonder	  he’s	  failing	  at	  it);	  and	  
being	  a	  bad	  painter	  suggests	  no	  realizable	  task,	  project,	  or	  end	  point.	  But	  in	  the	  Preface	  
to	   the	   Investigations	   these	  metaphors	  are	  happily	   combined.	  He	   is	  no	   longer	   trying	   to	  
assemble	  a	  landscape	  but	  sketches	  of	  landscape,	  and	  even	  if	  some	  of	  them	  are	  marred	  
by	   poor	   draftsmanship	   they	   have	   a	   definite	   goal	   and	   function	   –	   they	   should	   give	   the	  
reader	  an	  impression	  of	  that	  landscape.	  	  Third,	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  Goethe,	  he	  need-­‐
ed	  to	  see	  that	  there	  was	  a	  conception	  of	   intellectual	  order	  that	  did	  not	  depend	  on	  ab-­‐
straction;	  and,	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  Plato,	  that	  his	  remarks	  could	  easily	  be	  arranged	  to	  
form	  a	  kind	  of	  dialogue,	  thereby	  introducing	  a	  further	  element	  of	  spontaneity	  and	  spo-­‐
ken	  language	  (as	  we	  might	  expect,	  given	  Wittgenstein’s	  views	  on	  intellectual	  influence,	  
the	  influences	  of	  Goethe	  and	  Plato	  are	  utterly	  transformed	  by	  and	  assimilated	  into	  Witt-­‐
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genstein’s	  personality.	  They	  are	  no	  longer	  dry	  husks	  or	  eggshells,	  they	  have	  become	  part	  
of	  his	  originality,	  part	  of	  his	  soil).	  In	  the	  Investigations,	  especially	  in	  the	  Preface,	  all	  these	  
things	  have	  come	  together,	  and	  what	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  weakness	  proves	  to	  be	  a	  strength:	  
After	  several	  unsuccessful	  attempts	  to	  weld	  my	  results	  together	  into	  such	  a	  whole,	  I	  realized	  
that	   I	   should	  never	   succeed.	   The	  best	   that	   I	   could	  write	  would	  never	  be	  more	   than	  philo-­‐
sophical	  remarks;	  my	  thoughts	  soon	  grew	  feeble	  if	  I	  tried	  to	  force	  them	  along	  a	  single	  track	  
against	  their	  inclination.	  –	  And	  this	  was,	  of	  course,	  connected	  with	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  in-­‐
vestigation.	   For	   it	   compels	   us	   to	   travel	   criss-­‐cross	   in	   every	   direction	   over	   a	   wide	   field	   of	  
thought.	  –	  The	  philosophical	   remarks	   in	   this	  book	  are,	  as	   it	  were,	  a	  number	  of	  sketches	  of	  
landscapes	  which	  were	  made	  in	  the	  course	  of	  these	  long	  meandering	  journeys.	  
The	  same	  or	  almost	  the	  same	  points	  were	  always	  being	  approached	  afresh	  from	  different	  di-­‐
rections,	  and	  new	  sketches	  made.	  Very	  many	  of	  these	  were	  badly	  drawn	  or	  lacking	  in	  char-­‐
acter,	  marked	  by	  all	   the	  defects	  of	   a	  weak	  draughtsman.	  And	  when	   they	  were	   rejected,	   a	  
number	   of	   half-­‐way	   decent	   ones	  were	   left,	  which	   then	   had	   to	   be	   arranged	   and	   often	   cut	  
down,	  in	  order	  to	  give	  the	  viewer	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  landscape.	  So	  this	  book	  is	  really	  just	  an	  al-­‐
bum.	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  3e,	  4e)	  
In	  both	  The	  Prelude	  and	  the	  Investigations,	  we	  notice	  that	  the	  main	  enemies	  are	  am-­‐
bition	  and	  the	  will:	  both	  writers	  exhaust	  and	  harry	  themselves	  trying	  to	  achieve	  a	  con-­‐
ventional	  goal.	  They	  haul	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  their	  task	  and	  talent,	  force	  themselves	  to	  
get	  words	  down	  on	  the	  page,	  and	  yet	  nothing	  can	  quite	  disguise	  their	  deeper	  knowledge	  
that	  there	  is	  something	  fundamentally	  awry	  about	  their	  basic	  projects.	  	  It	  is	  at	  the	  point	  
of	  despair	  that	  the	  truth	  reveals	   itself	  and	  it	   is	  right	  in	  front	  of	  their	  eyes.	  Wordsworth	  
didn’t	  need	  to	  do	  research	  on	  his	  subject;	  book-­‐learning	  was	  the	   last	  thing	  he	  needed:	  
his	  childhood	  stood	  before	  him,	  and	  yet	  he	  could	  not	  see	  it	  as	  a	  subject	  matter	  because	  
the	   idea	   of	   someone	   low-­‐born	   writing	   a	   15,000-­‐line	   psychological	   autobiography	   in	  
verse	  was	  unheard	  of	   	  an	  act	  of	  apparently	  astounding	  egotism.	  Similarly,	   it	  took	  years	  
for	  Wittgenstein	   to	   see	   that	   his	   remarks	   could	   be	  more	   than	   just	   teaching	   notes	   that	  
could	  be	   read	  after	  his	  death,	  and	   that,	  with	  a	   little	  pruning,	   re-­‐ordering,	  and	  a	   touch	  
more	  of	  the	  conversational	  voice,	  they	  could	  not	  only	  form	  a	  good	  book,	  but	  an	  infinitely	  
better	   book	   than	   the	   one	   he	   originally	   planned	   to	  write.	   Here	  was	   another	   discovery	  
that	  was	   right	   in	   front	  of	  his	  eyes,	  and	  was,	   in	  a	  way,	  obvious,	  but	  which	   took	  him	  an	  
immense	  and	  exhausting	  effort	  to	  see.	  	  It	  turns	  out	  that,	  for	  Wittgenstein,	  a	  tormenting	  
problem	   of	   philosophical	   form,	   and	   a	   tormenting	   problem	   of	   philosophy,	   present	   the	  
same	  kind	  of	  difficulty	  and	  have	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  solution.	  
What	  Wordsworth	   and	  Wittgenstein	   needed	  was	   not	   effort	   and	  will,	   but	   time	   and	  
what	  Wordsworth	   called	  «wise	  passiveness».	  He	   remarks	   in	   the	  poetic	  preface	   to	  The	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Prelude	  that	  the	  poet’s	  mind	  is	  «best	  pleased	  /	  While	  she	  as	  duteous	  as	  the	  mother	  dove	  
/	   Sits	   brooding	   […]»	   (Wordsworth	   [1954]:	   139-­‐41);	   that	   poetry	   is	   best	   thought	   of	   as	  
«emotion	  recollected	  in	  tranquility»	  (Wordsworth	  [1984]:	  611);	  and	  many	  of	  his	  poems	  
mention	  that	  a	  gap	  of	  between	  two	  and	  five	  years	  passed	  between	  the	  original	  scene	  of	  
inspiration	  and	  the	  actual	  writing	  of	  a	  poem.	  Wittgenstein	  also	   liked	  to	  emphasize	   the	  
virtues	  of	  slow	  thought:	  «This	  is	  how	  philosophers	  should	  salute	  each	  other:	  “Take	  your	  
time!”	  [CV:	  91e];	  My	  sentences	  are	  all	  to	  be	  read	  slowly»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  65e);	  «In	  
philosophy	  the	  winner	  of	  the	  race	  is	  the	  one	  who	  can	  run	  most	  slowly.	  Or:	  the	  one	  who	  
gets	  to	  the	  winning	  post	  last»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  40e).	  The	  unconscious	  needs	  time	  to	  
do	   its	  work:	   to	  worm	   its	  way	   past	   convention,	   superficial	   conceptualizations,	   and	   the	  
limited	  catalogue	  of	  established	  literary	  forms	  which	  tradition	  has	  bequeathed.	  	  
In	  Wordsworth	  and	  Wittgenstein,	   ambition,	   convention,	   consciousness	  and	   the	  will	  
are	  the	  enemy,	  which	  brings	  me	  to	  Kubla	  Khan	  –	  a	  poem	  whose	  composition	  allegedly	  
avoided	  ambition,	  convention,	  consciousness	  and	  the	  will	  altogether	   (both	  Kubla	  Khan	  
and	  its	  Preface	  are	  included	  in	  an	  appendix	  to	  this	  article).	  
What	  possible	  analogies	  could	  there	  be	  between	  this	  poem	  and	  the	   Investigations?	  
Well,	  we	  might	  note	  that	  both	  works	  are	  apparently	  fragmentary:	  Kubla	  Khan	  is	  divided	  
into	  four	  related	  sections	  but	  there	  is	  no	  transitional	  binding	  material	  and	  the	  relation-­‐
ships	   between	   the	   four	   parts	   are	   far	   from	   clear.	   The	   Investigations	   is	   also	   apparently	  
fragmentary	  and	  –	  to	  a	  surprising	  extent	  for	  a	  philosophy	  book	  –	  reliant	  on	  images,	  sym-­‐
bols	  and	  analogies.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  a	  stylistic	  ornament,	  but	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	  method:	  he	  hopes	  to	  loosen	  the	  grip	  of	  false	  pictures	  which	  possesses	  us	  by	  sug-­‐
gesting	  others.	  Similarly,	  one	  cannot	   fail	   to	  be	  struck	  by	  the	  fact	   that	   the	   landscape	  of	  
Kubla	  Khan	  is	  mysterious	  and	  symbolic,	  and	  any	  explanation	  of	  it	  requires	  these	  symbols	  
to	  be	  explicated	  and	  unpacked.	  Finally,	  we	  might	  note	  that	  Kubla	  Khan,	  like	  the	  Investi-­‐
gations,	   presents	  us	  with	   sketches	  of	  mountainous	   landscapes;	   or	   rather	   a	  number	  of	  
sketches	  of	  the	  same	  rugged	  landscape	  drawn	  from	  different	  angles.	  	  
Both	  works	  are	  equipped	  with	  prefaces	  which	  express	  doubts	  about	  the	  works	  which	  
follow.	  Coleridge	  finds	  the	  need	  to	  diminish	  his	  work	  in	  its	  Preface.	  Besides	  subtitling	  it	  
“a	  fragment”,	  he	  says	  that,	  in	  publishing	  the	  poem,	  he	  is	  merely	  acceding	  to	  the	  request	  
of	  Lord	  Byron	  «a	  poet	  of	  great	  and	  deserved	  celebrity»;	  and	  that,	  in	  his	  own	  opinion,	  he	  
publishes	  the	  poem	  ‘rather	  as	  a	  psychological	  curiosity,	  than	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  any	  sup-­‐
posed	  poetic	  merits».	  Similarly,	  despite	  Wittgenstein	  saying	  that	  he	  realizes	  his	  fragmen-­‐
tary	  form,	  jumping	  from	  one	  topic	  to	  another,	  is	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  sub-­‐
ject	  matter,	  he	  still	  expresses	  deep	  unease	  about	  his	  work.	  He	  comments	  that	  «the	  best	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I	   could	  write	  would	   never	   be	  more	   than	  philosophical	   remarks»	   (Wittgenstein	   [2009]:	  
3e);	   «I	  make	   [these	   remarks]	   public	   with	   some	  misgivings.	   It	   is	   not	   impossible	   that	   it	  
should	  fall	  to	  the	  lot	  of	  this	  work,	  in	  its	  poverty,	  and	  in	  the	  darkness	  of	  this	  time,	  to	  bring	  
light	  into	  one	  brain	  or	  another	  –	  but,	  of	  course,	  it	  is	  not	  likely»	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  4e);	  
«I	   should	  have	   liked	   to	  produce	  a	   good	  book.	   It	   has	  not	   turned	  out	   that	  way,	  but	   the	  
time	  is	  past	  in	  which	  I	  could	  improve	  it»	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  4e).	  Finally,	  in	  1946,	  long	  
after	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  Investigations	  was	  finished,	  he	  still	  expresses	  doubts	  about	  the	  val-­‐
ue	  and	  originality	  of	  the	  form	  he	  has	  so	  painfully	  discovered:	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  write	  in	  a	  style	  that	  is	  unoriginal	  in	  form	  –	  like	  mine	  –	  but	  with	  well	  chosen	  
words;	  or	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  in	  one	  that	   is	  original	   in	  form,	  freshly	  grown	  from	  within	  one-­‐
self.	   (And	  also	  of	   course	   in	  one	  which	   is	  botched	   together	   just	  anyhow	  out	  of	  old	   furnish-­‐
ings).	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  60e)	  
In	  some	  sense	  too,	  all	  three	  works	  under	  discussion	  look	  incomplete.	  Coleridge	  was	  
convinced	  that	  Kubla	  Khan	  lacked	  the	  two	  or	  three	  hundred	  lines	  he	  felt	  he	  had	  original-­‐
ly	  composed	  for	  it	  (Coleridge	  [1991]:	  296)	  and,	  as	  he	  says	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Preface:	  the	  
author	  has	  frequently	  purposed	  to	  finish	  for	  himself	  what	  had	  been	  originally,	  as	  it	  were,	  
given	   to	  him.	  «I	   shall	   sing	  a	   sweeter	   song	   today5:	  but	   that	   to-­‐morrow	   is	   yet	   to	   come»	  
(Coleridge	   [1991]:	  296-­‐7).	   The	  poem’s	   fragmentary	  and	  apparently	   incomplete	   state	   is	  
certainly	   one	   reason	   why	   he	   withheld	   its	   publication	   for	   so	   long.	   The	   Investigations	  
seems	  obviously	  incomplete,	  and	  one	  reason	  why	  Wordsworth	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  pub-­‐
lish	  The	  Prelude	  himself	  is	  that	  it	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  genuine	  prelude	  to	  his	  life’s	  great	  
task:	   an	  enormous	   three-­‐part	  philosophical	  poem	  called	  The	  Recluse,	  which	  would	  ex-­‐
pound	  Wordsworth’s	  views	  on	  man,	  nature	  and	  society.	  	  	  In	  the	  prose	  preface	  he	  writes:	  	  
The	   preparatory	   poem	   [The	   Prelude6]	   is	   biographical,	   and	   conducts	   the	   history	   of	   the	   Au-­‐
thor’s	  mind	  to	  the	  point	  when	  he	  was	  emboldened	  to	  hope	  that	  his	  faculties	  were	  sufficient-­‐
ly	  matured	  for	  entering	  upon	  the	  arduous	  labour	  which	  he	  had	  proposed	  to	  himself	  [The	  Re-­‐
cluse];	  and	  the	  two	  Works	  have	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  relation	  to	  each	  other,	  if	  he	  may	  so	  express	  
himself,	  as	  the	  ante-­‐chapel	  has	  to	  the	  body	  of	  a	  gothic	  church.	  (Wordsworth	  [1977]:	  36)	  
Wordsworth	   published	   the	   second	   part	   The	   Recluse	   as	   The	   Excursion	   in	   1814,	   but	  
must	  have	  felt	  deeply	  discouraged	  by	  its	  reception	  (it	  was	  the	  recipient	  of	  a	  destructive	  
review	  by	  Francis	  Jeffrey	  beginning	  with	  the	  celebrated	  sentence,	  «This	  will	  never	  do»);	  	  
5	  The	  quotation	  is	  from	  Theocritus;	  Coleridge	  gives	  the	  untranslated	  Greek.	  
6	  Wordsworth	  did	  not	  call	  his	  poem	  “The	  Prelude”;	  this	  title,	  which	  emphasizes	  the	  poem’s	  antic-­‐
ipatory	  and	  dependent	  status,	  was	  agreed	  on	  by	  the	  poet’s	  literary	  executors.	  Wordsworth	  tend-­‐
ed	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  work	  as	  “The	  poem	  to	  Coleridge”.	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several	  hundred	  lines	  of	  the	  first	  part	  were	  sketched	  but	  never	  published;	  and	  the	  third	  
remained	  completely	  unwritten.	  Independent	  publication	  of	  The	  Prelude	  was	  thus	  ruled	  
out	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first	  (as	  I	  mentioned	  above),	  its	  extreme	  length	  and	  autobiograph-­‐
ical	  content;	  second,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  explained	  why	  Wordsworth’s	  upbringing	  made	  him	  
uniquely	   fitted	   for	   a	   great	   task,	  when	   he	   had	  manifestly	   failed	   to	   complete	   this	   great	  
task.	  	  
In	  all	   three	  cases	  one	  feels	  that	  the	  works	  were	  so	  radical	  and	  so	  original	  that	  their	  
authors	   did	   not	   quite	   understand	   what	   they	   had	   produced.	   In	   at	   least	   the	   cases	   of	  
Wordsworth	  and	  Coleridge,	  neither	  appeared	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  apparently	  unsatis-­‐
factory	  work	   they	  had	  produced,	  was	   in	   fact	  more	  brilliant	  and	  original	   than	   the	  work	  
they	  had	  been	  striving	  to	  produce;	  and	  that	  the	  final	  work	  was,	  contrary	  to	  all	  appear-­‐
ances,	  finished	  and	  complete.	  
Although	   it	  has	   striking	   sections,	  no	  one	   thinks	   that	  The	  Excursion	   is	  Wordsworth’s	  
best	  work,	  and	  it	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  feel	  that,	  if	  the	  other	  two	  sections	  had	  been	  completed,	  
then	   this	   judgement	  would	  have	  been	   revised;	   indeed,	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   couldn’t	   com-­‐
plete	  the	  other	  two	  sections	  suggests	  his	  inspiration	  was	  lower,	  and	  his	  decision	  to	  abort	  
them	  correct.	  From	  our	  present	  perspective,	  we	  can	  also	  see	   that,	   in	  writing	  The	  Prel-­‐
ude,	  Wordsworth	  had	  actually	  written	  and	  completed	  the	  poem	  about	  man,	  nature	  and	  
society	   he	  was	   still	   trying	   to	  write;	   but	  The	   Prelude’s	   dissimilarity	   to	   earlier	   and	  more	  
conventional	   philosophical	   poems	   prevented	   him	   from	   recognizing	   this.	   In	   the	   same	  
way,	   it	   is	   exactly	   the	   compression	   of	  Kubla	   Khan	   –	   together	  with	   its	  mysterious,	   frag-­‐
mentary	   and	   symbolic	   form	  –	  which	  explain	   its	   power	   and	  potency:	  one	   can	  only	   feel	  
that,	  had	  Coleridge	  added	  his	  additional	  several	  hundred	  lines,	  and	  produced	  a	  smooth-­‐
er,	  more	   rational	   and	  more	   conventional	   poem,	   his	  work	  would	   have	  been	  much	   less	  
striking.	  Again,	  he	  had	  completed	  the	  work	  he	  continued	  to	  try	  and	  write,	  but	  his	  work	  
was	  too	  darkly	  symbolic,	  fragmentary	  and	  original	  for	  him	  to	  recognize	  it	  as	  already	  fin-­‐
ished.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Investigations	  too,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  form	  Wittgenstein	  eventually	  
arrived	  at	  is	  altogether	  more	  telling	  and	  effective	  than	  any	  of	  the	  conventional	  forms	  he	  
earlier	  envisaged.	  The	  dialogic	  form	  invites	  the	  reader	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  conversation,	  
and	  this	  effect	  is	  enhanced	  by	  the	  use	  of	  reader-­‐directed	  unanswered	  questions	  and	  the	  
perpetual	  use	  of	  analogies	  which	  the	  reader	  must	  interpret.	  In	  addition,	  the	  attempt	  to	  
achieve	  a	  perspicuous	  overview	  is	  something	  which	  cannot	  be	  put	  on	  the	  page	  for	  the	  
reader	  to	  register;	  attaining	  such	  an	  overview	  is	  something	  that	  can	  only	  come	  about	  in	  
the	  reader’s	  consciousness	  –	  all	  the	  text	  can	  do	  is	  offer	  a	  series	  of	  prompts	  that	  may	  or	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may	   not	   achieve	   this	   outcome.	   	   The	   riskiness	   inherent	   in	   the	  method	   can	   look	   like	   a	  
weakness,	  but	  when	  it	  succeeds,	  the	  effect	   it	  achieves	  is	  altogether	  more	  intimate	  and	  
permanent.	  	  Telling	  a	  joke	  is	  a	  much	  riskier	  undertaking	  than	  explaining	  a	  joke,	  but	  the	  
sudden	  and	  explosive	   reordering	  achieved	  by	  a	   successful	   joke	   is	  of	  a	  wholly	  different	  
kind	  and	  degree	  from	  that	  achieved	  by	  the	  careful	  explanation	  of	  a	  joke.	  	  
Can	   it	  be	  claimed	   that	   the	   Investigations	   is	   in	   fact	   complete,	  and	   that	  Wittgenstein	  
for	  some	  reason	  did	  not	  recognize	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case?	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  
we	  would	  have	  to	  decide	  what	  it	  would	  be	  for	  such	  a	  work	  to	  be	  finished:	  how	  should	  a	  
tale	  which	  starts	  with	  a	  child	  learning	  language,	  and	  then	  traces	  the	  apparently	  endless	  
muddles	  and	  aporias	  language	  gets	  us	  into,	  end?	  What	  would	  a	  satisfying	  dénouement	  
be?	  One	  point	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  throughout	  the	  book	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  codi-­‐
fy	  and	  catalogue	  our	  understanding	  of	   language	  in	  any	  area	  that	  is	  not	  self-­‐consciously	  
constructed,	  and	  that	  every	  significant	  list	  has	  to	  end	  “and	  similar	  things”,	  “and	  the	  like”,	  
“and	  so	  on”,	  “etc”.	  Moreover,	  dissolving	  one	  set	  of	  puzzles	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  will	  
not	  recur;	  in	  fact,	  it	  is	  all	  too	  likely	  that	  they	  will	  recur.	  Thus,	  if	  Wittgenstein	  felt	  he	  could	  
not	  publish	  his	  work	  because	  it	  was	  incomplete,	  then	  once	  again,	  this	  is	  a	  case	  of	  a	  writ-­‐
er	   not	   quite	   recognizing	   what	   he	   has	   produced.	   Incompleteness	   in	   this	   case	   did	   not	  
mean	  failure;	  it	  was	  an	  inevitable	  concomitant	  of	  success;	  of	  seeing	  the	  problem	  clearly.	  	  
A	  work	  like	  this	  could	  never	  be	  completed;	  it	  could	  only	  be	  abandoned,	  and	  whether	  it	  
was	  abandoned	  twenty	  pages	  earlier	  or	  a	  hundred	  pages	   later	  could	  make	   little	  differ-­‐
ence.	  	  
The	   inability	  of	  all	   three	  authors	  to	  recognize	  both	  the	  quality	  and	  completeness	  of	  
their	  own	  work	  is	  supported	  by	  two	  telling	  facts.	  First,	  in	  all	  three	  cases,	  there	  was	  a	  very	  
extended	   lapse	   of	   time	   between	   their	   earliest	   versions	   being	   sketched	   and	   their	   final	  
versions	  being	  published.	  In	  Kubla	  Khan’s	  case	  about	  19	  years;	  in	  the	  Investigations’	  24;	  
in	  The	  Prelude’s	  52.	  Second,	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  all	  three	  works	  required	  the	  intervention	  of	  
others	   to	   get	   them	   into	   print:	   in	   Coleridge’s	   case,	   Lord	   Byron;	   in	   the	   cases	   of	   both	  
Wordsworth	  and	  Wittgenstein,	  their	  literary	  executors.	  	  	  
The	  Prelude	  is	  work	  about	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  mind,	  and	  the	  role	  man,	  society	  and	  na-­‐
ture	  plays	   in	   it;	  and	  the	  same	   is	   true	  of	   the	   Investigations.	  Furthermore,	  both	  are	  self-­‐
conscious	  works:	  The	  Prelude	   is	  a	  poem	  about	  poetry	  and	  being	  a	  poet;	   the	   Investiga-­‐
tions	  is	  a	  book	  about	  philosophy	  and	  being	  a	  philosopher.	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It	  is	  much	  more	  contentious	  to	  make	  both	  claims	  about	  Kubla	  Khan	  but	  I	  think	  both	  
claims	  are	  nonetheless	  true7.	   	  The	  first	  stanza	  is	  about	  order	  and	  control:	  the	  Khan	  de-­‐
crees	  a	  pleasure	  dome	  to	  be	  built,	  and	  an	  exactly	  specified	  area	  («twice	  five	  miles»)	   is	  
enclosed	  with	   a	  wall	   to	   create	   a	   sunlit	   garden.	   In	   the	   second	   stanza,	   this	   eighteenth-­‐
century	   landscape	   is	   contrasted	   with	   a	   savage	   chasm	   full	   of	   violence,	   sacred	   terror,	  
unsleeping	  elemental	  force,	  and	  unappeased	  sexual	  longing.	  	  It	  seems	  not	  unreasonable	  
to	  find	  the	  Ego’s	  pursuit	  of	  rational	  pleasures	  in	  the	  first	  stanza;	  and	  the	  terrifying	  dark	  
energies	  of	  the	  Id	  –	  Eros	  and	  Thanatos	  –	  in	  the	  second.	  	  
Many	  accounts	  of	  the	  creative	  process	  mention	  that	  it	  has	  two	  components:	  an	  initial	  
upsurge	  of	  inspiration,	  followed	  by	  a	  period	  of	  reflection	  and	  rational	  criticism:	  only	  the	  
conjunction	  of	  the	  two	  can	  result	  in	  satisfactory	  art.	  Accordingly,	  in	  the	  third	  stanza,	  we	  
find	  that	  the	   lucid	  rationality	  of	  the	  Ego	  and	  the	  savage	  energies	  of	  the	   Id	  are	  brought	  
together,	  as	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  sunny	  pleasure	  dome	  floats	  on	  waves	  where	  the	  mingled	  
measure	  of	  the	  fountain	  and	  the	  caves	  can	  be	  heard.	  	  
The	   result	   is	   described	   in	   two	  elements	  which	  emerge	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   last	  
stanza:	  music	  and	  a	  musician.	  The	  narrator	  fantasizes	  about	  taking	  up	  the	  song,	  and	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  poem	  he	  imagines	  himself	  worshipped	  as	  a	  mystically	  inspired	  bard.	  	  If	  we	  
recall	   Goethe’s	   remark	   that	   architecture	   is	   frozen	  music,	   then	   perhaps	   the	  Abyssinian	  
maid	   releases	   the	   harmonies	   that	   were	   present	   from	   the	   beginning	   in	   the	   pleasure	  
dome	  and	  its	  garden.	  But	  why	  music	  should	  music	  emerge	  at	  this	  point?	  Why	  not	  poet-­‐
ry?	  My	  suspicion	  is	  this:	  by	  the	  very	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  music	  was	  beginning	  to	  re-­‐
place	  poetry	  as	  the	  paradigm	  of	  art,	  and	  thus	  is	  the	  most	  suitable	  artform	  to	  go	  proxy	  for	  
art	  of	  all	  kinds.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  nineteenth	  century,	  music’s	  ascent	  was	  complete:	  we	  
can	  find	  this	  reflected	  in	  Pater’s	  remark,	  “All	  art	  aspires	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  music”;	  and	  
in	  the	  treatment	  which	  Richard	  Wagner	  demanded	  and	  received.	  
From	  this	  interpretation	  we	  can	  see	  two	  things:	  first,	  that	  the	  poem	  is	  complete;	  se-­‐
cond,	   that	  Kubla	  Khan,	   in	   symbolic	   form,	   represents	   the	  mind	  –	   and	   in	   particular,	   the	  
mind	  of	  the	  creative	  artist	  –	  in	  operation.	  Like	  The	  Prelude,	  it	  is	  poem	  about	  poetry	  and	  
the	  mind	  of	  the	  poet.	  The	  landscape	  also	  contains	  biographical	  elements.	  The	  mountains	  
and	  valleys	  of	  Cumbria	  are	  described	  at	  length	  in	  The	  Prelude;	  and	  just	  as	  we	  can	  detect	  
the	   hills	   around	   Kirchberg	   	   and	   Trattenbach	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   writings,	   so	   Richard	  
Holmes	   detects	   the	   hills	   and	   valleys	   of	   Somerset	   in	   Coleridge’s	   vision:	   «[…]	   Any	   foot-­‐	  
7	   The	   following	   three	   paragraphs	   summarize	   the	   argument	   of	  my	   paper	   “Kubla	   Khan”	   and	   the	  
Structure	  of	  the	  Psyche,	  “English”,	  vol.	  40,	  no.	  167,	  Summer	  1991,	  pp.	  145-­‐54.	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walker	   can	   still	   discover	   the	   most	   striking	   topographical	   “source”	   [of	   the	   poem]	   for	  
themselves:	   it	   lies	   in	  what	  might	   be	   called	   the	   erotic,	  magical	   geography	   of	   Culborne	  
Combe	   seen	   from	  Ash	   Farm	   [where	  Coleridge	  wrote	   the	  poem].	   Between	   the	   smooth	  
curved	   flanks	   of	   the	   coastal	   hills,	   a	   thickly	   wooded	   gulley	   runs	   down	   to	   the	   sea	   […]»	  
(Holmes	  [1989]:	  164n).	  	  
To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  Wordsworth,	  Coleridge	  and	  Wittgenstein’s	  misgivings	  about	  their	  
own	  projects	  were	  borne	  out	  by	   their	   reception,	  even	  though	  all	   three	  works	  are	  now	  
generally	  accepted	  as	  seminal	  masterpieces.	  	  
Byron,	  Leigh	  Hunt	  and	  Lamb	  may	  have	  perceived	  Kubla	  Khan’s	  quality	   from	  the	  be-­‐
ginning,	  but	   its	  first	  reviewers	   in	  periodicals	  did	  not:	  «the	  poem	  […]	  is	  below	  criticism»	  
reported	  the	  Monthly	  Review,	  January	  1817;	  while	  Joseph	  Conder,	  in	  the	  Eclectic	  Review	  
of	  June	  1816,	  was	  more	  expansive	  but	  barely	  more	  complimentary:	  
As	  for	  Kubla	  Khan,	  and	  the	  Pains	  of	  Sleep,	  we	  can	  only	  regret	  the	  publication	  of	  them,	  as	  af-­‐
fording	  a	  proof	  that	  the	  Author	  over-­‐rates	  the	   importance	  of	  his	  name.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  
former,	  which	  is	  professedly	  published	  as	  a	  psychological	  curiosity,	  it	  having	  been	  composed	  
during	   sleep,	   there	  appears	   to	  us	  nothing	   in	   the	  quality	  of	   the	   lines	   to	   render	   the	   circum-­‐
stance	  extraordinary.	  
It	   is	  not	  until	   the	   late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  when	  interest	   in	  and	  
respect	  for	  the	  unconscious	  mind	  had	  become	  widespread,	  that	  the	  poem	  could	  be	  seen	  
as	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  musical	  but	  nonsensical	  fragment.	  	  
Had	  The	  Prelude	  been	  published	  in	  1805	  when	  Wordsworth	  was	  an	  obscure	  but	  con-­‐
tentious	   figure,	   it	  would	   have	   faced	   equally	  withering	   criticism.	   However,	   it	  was	   pub-­‐
lished	  in	  1850,	  when	  Wordsworth	  was	  a	  great	  and	  famous	  man	  who	  had,	  to	  a	  large	  ex-­‐
tent,	  created	  the	  taste	  by	  which	  he	  was	  appreciated.	  Accordingly,	   its	  reception	  was	  re-­‐
spectful,	  although	  it	  was	  hardly	  recognized	  for	  the	  masterpiece	  it	  is.	  Introducing	  a	  selec-­‐
tion	   of	   Wordsworth’s	   poems	   in	   1879,	   even	   the	   sympathetic	   Matthew	   Arnold	   could	  
write:	   «The	   Excursion	   and	   the	   Prelude,	   his	   poems	   of	   greatest	   bulk,	   are	   by	   no	  means	  
Wordsworth’s	  best	  work»	  (Wordsworth	  [1954]:	  v),	  and	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  publication	  of	  
de	  Sélincourt’s	  edition	  of	  1928	  that	  the	  poem	  achieved	  its	  proper	  place	  in	  English	  litera-­‐
ture.	  	  	  
The	   form	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	   Investigations	  was	  not	   greeted	  with	   general	   acclaim	  ei-­‐
ther.	  Not	  until	  ten	  years	  after	  its	  publication	  –	  in	  the	  final	  section	  of	  Cavell’s	  The	  Availa-­‐
bility	   of	  Wittgenstein’s	   Later	   Philosophy	   –	   was	   any	   awareness	   shown	   that	   the	   book’s	  
form	  was	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  its	  philosophical	  achievement.	  And	  even	  now,	  one	  can	  find	  
many	   commentators	  who	   largely	   ignore	   the	   form	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	   (e.g.,	  Hacker	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and	  Baker),	  several	  who	  regret	  it	  (e.g.,	  Binkley	  and	  Grayling),	  and	  even	  some	  who	  think	  
it	  a	  symptom	  of	  psychological	  abnormality	  (e.g.,	  Jaakko	  Hintikka’s	  claim	  that	  the	  form	  of	  
Wittgenstein’s	  writing	  was	  a	  product	  of	  his	  [alleged]	  dyslexia)8.	  
The	  Ideal	  Type9	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  Romantic	  preface	  I	  have	  been	  discussing	  posses	  the	  fol-­‐
lowing	  features:	  1)	  the	  author	  says	  he	  tried	  to	  write	  a	  conventional	  work	  and	  after	  much	  
struggle	  abandoned	  the	  project;	  2)	  the	  form	  and	  content	  of	  the	  work	  seemed	  to	  be	  im-­‐
mediately	  in	  front	  of	  his	  eyes,	  and	  yet	  it	  took	  many	  years	  for	  the	  work	  to	  reach	  its	  final	  
published	  condition;	  3)	  he	  feels	  doubts	  about	  the	  work	  he	  finally	  produced;	  in	  particular,	  
he	  apologizes	  for	   its	  being	  fragmentary,	  too	  personal,	  obscure	  or	  otherwise	  unsatisfac-­‐
tory;	  4)	  he	  correctly	  anticipates	  negative	  criticism;	  5)	  he	  does	  not	  see	  that	  the	  final	  out-­‐
come	   is	  much	  better	  than	  the	  work	  he	  originally	  planned;	  6)	  the	  author	  feels	  the	  pub-­‐
lished	  work	  to	  be	  in	  some	  way	  incomplete;	  7)	  he	  does	  not	  realize	  that	  his	  work	  is	  as	  fin-­‐
ished	  as	  it	  can	  be	  –	  indeed,	  he	  continues	  trying	  to	  complete	  it;	  8)	  the	  work’s	  publication	  
necessitated	  the	  intervention	  of	  others;	  9)	  the	  work	  is	  partially	  about,	  and	  partially	  de-­‐
rives	  from,	  the	  unsophisticated,	  unconscious,	  and	  sometimes	  primitive	  mind	  (the	  child,	  
the	   Id,	   the	  peasant);	   10)	   the	  work	  has	  a	   largely	   rural	   (often	  mountainous)	   setting;	  11)	  
the	  work	  has	  a	  solitary	  –	  often	  a	  solitary	  wanderer	  -­‐	  as	  its	  central	  figure;	  12)	  it	  contains	  
autobiographical	   and	   confessional	   elements;	   13)	   it	   is	   (amongst	   other	   things)	   self-­‐
consciously	  about	  the	  act	  of	  its	  own	  creation;	  14)	  it	  rejects	  conventional	  notions	  of	  theo-­‐
retical	  explanation.	  	  	  
Not	  every	  preface	  and	  work	   I’ve	  discussed	  contains	  all	   these	   features,	  and	   in	   some	  
these	  features	  are	  more	  strongly	  marked	  than	  in	  others,	  but	  I	  hope	  it	   is	  now	  clear	  that	  
these	  works	  and	  prefaces	  do	  form	  a	  type	  of	  natural	  kind,	  and	  that	  the	  Preface	  to	  the	  In-­‐
vestigations	  is	  a	  paradigm	  instance	  of	  it.	  
3.	  Wittgenstein’s	   thoughts	  on	  aesthetics	  are	  undoubtedly	  exciting	  and	   interesting,	  and	  
contain	  some	  of	  the	  first	  rational	  words	  ever	  spoken	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  critical	  reasoning	  
and	   explanation.	   However,	   to	   restrict	   a	   discussion	   of	   Wittgenstein	   and	   aesthetics	   to	  	  
8	  He	  outlined	  this	  theory	  in	  a	  paper	  delivered	  at	  the	  Wittgenstein	  memorial	  conference	  in	  Kirch-­‐
berg	  in	  2001.	  
9	  The	  positing	  of	  an	  Ideal	  Type	  is	  a	  helpful	  way	  of	  obtaining	  a	  perspicuous	  overview	  in	  some	  areas	  
of	  the	  Arts.	   It	   is	   frequently	  encountered	  (although	  infrequently	  noted)	   in	  discussions	  of	  tragedy	  
and	  the	  novel;	  and	  Hugh	  Macdonald,	  for	  example,	  gives	  his	  reader	  an	  illuminating	  perspective	  on	  
Romantic	  piano	  music	  by	  grouping	  pieces	  according	  to	  their	  distance	  from	  the	  key	  of	  G-­‐flat	  in	  9/8	  
time,	  even	  though	  –	  in	  fact	  precisely	  because	  –	  there	  is	  no	  Romantic	  piano	  piece	  which	  combines	  
both	  this	  key	  and	  time	  signature.	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things	  he	  explicitly	  thought	  and	  said	  about	  the	  topic	  is	  a	  mistake.	  Not	  only	  did	  he	  see	  the	  
closest	   possible	   analogy	  between	  an	   aesthetic	   and	   a	  philosophical	   investigation	   (Witt-­‐
genstein	   [1998]:	   29e,	   91e),	   but	   his	   entire	   approach	   to	   philosophy	  has	   an	   aesthetic	   di-­‐
mension,	  and	  this	  dimension	  is	  not	  separable	  from	  its	  philosophical	  dimension.	  By	  look-­‐
ing	  at	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	   in	   the	  context	  of	  Romantic	  poetry	  and	  prose,	   I	  hope	   I	  have	  
gone	  some	  way	  towards	  demonstrating	  this	  truth.	  
Appendix	  
Samuel	  Taylor	  Coleridge	  (1772-­‐1834)	  composed	  Kubla	  Khan	   in	  C.1797-­‐8,	  and	  first	  pub-­‐
lished	  it,	  together	  with	  the	  following	  preface,	  in	  1816.	  	  
Kubla	  Khan;	  Or,	  A	  Vision	  in	  a	  Dream.	  A	  Fragment	  
The	  following	  fragment	  is	  here	  published	  at	  the	  request	  of	  a	  poet	  of	  great	  and	  deserved	  
celebrity	  [Lord	  Byron],	  and,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  author's	  own	  opinions	  are	  concerned,	  rather	  as	  
a	  psychological	  curiosity,	  than	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  any	  supposed	  poetic	  merits.	  
In	  the	  summer	  of	  the	  year	  1797,	  the	  author,	  then	  in	  ill	  health,	  had	  retired	  to	  a	  lonely	  
farmhouse	  between	  Porlock	  and	  Linton,	  on	  the	  Exmoor	  confines	  of	  Somerset	  and	  Dev-­‐
onshire.	  In	  consequence	  of	  a	  slight	  indisposition,	  an	  anodyne	  had	  been	  prescribed,	  from	  
the	  effects	  of	  which	  he	  fell	  asleep	  in	  his	  chair	  at	  the	  moment	  that	  he	  was	  reading	  the	  fol-­‐
lowing	   sentence,	   or	  words	   of	   the	   same	   substance,	   in	  Purchas's	   Pilgrimage:	   "Here	   the	  
Khan	  Kubla	  commanded	  a	  palace	  to	  be	  built,	  and	  a	  stately	  garden	  thereunto.	  And	  thus	  
ten	  miles	  of	   fertile	  ground	  were	   inclosed	  with	  a	  wall."	  The	  author	  continued	  for	  about	  
three	  hours	   in	  a	  profound	  sleep,	  at	   least	  of	   the	  external	   senses,	  during	  which	   time	  he	  
has	  the	  most	  vivid	  confidence	  that	  he	  could	  not	  have	  composed	  less	  than	  from	  two	  to	  
three	   hundred	   lines;	   if	   that	   indeed	   can	   be	   called	   composition	   in	  which	   all	   the	   images	  
rose	  up	  before	  him	  as	   things,	  with	  a	  parallel	  production	  of	   the	   correspondent	  expres-­‐
sions,	   without	   any	   sensation	   or	   consciousness	   of	   effort.	   On	   awaking	   he	   appeared	   to	  
himself	  to	  have	  a	  distinct	  recollection	  of	  the	  whole,	  and	  taking	  his	  pen,	  ink,	  and	  paper,	  
instantly	  and	  eagerly	  wrote	  down	  the	  lines	  that	  are	  here	  preserved.	  At	  this	  moment	  he	  
was	  unforunately	  called	  out	  by	  a	  person	  on	  business	  from	  Porlock,	  and	  detained	  by	  him	  
above	  an	  hour,	  and	  on	  his	  return	  to	  his	  room,	  found,	  to	  his	  no	  small	  surprise	  and	  morti-­‐
fication,	   that	   though	  he	   still	   retained	   some	   vague	   and	  dim	   recollection	  of	   the	   general	  
purport	  of	   the	  vision,	  yet,	  with	   the	  exception	  of	  some	  eight	  or	   ten	  scattered	   lines	  and	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images,	   all	   the	   rest	   had	   passed	   away	   like	   the	   images	   on	   the	   surface	   of	   a	   stream	   into	  
which	  a	  stone	  has	  been	  cast,	  but,	  alas!	  without	  the	  after	  restoration	  of	  the	  latter!	  […]	  
Yet	   from	  the	  still	   surviving	   recollections	   in	  his	  mind,	   the	  author	  has	   frequently	  pur-­‐
posed	  to	  finish	  for	  himself	  what	  had	  been	  originally,	  as	  were,	  given	  to	  him.	  ‘I	  shall	  sing	  a	  
sweeter	  song	  today’:	  but	  the	  tomorrow	  is	  yet	  to	  come.	  As	  a	  contrast	  to	  this	  vision,	  I	  have	  
annexed	  a	  fragment	  of	  a	  very	  different	  character	  [‘The	  Pains	  of	  Sleep’],	  describing	  with	  
equal	  fidelity	  the	  dream	  of	  pain	  and	  disease.	  
Kubla	  Khan	  
In	  Xanadu	  did	  KubIa	  Khan	  	  
A	  stately	  pleasure	  dome	  decree:	  	  
Where	  Alph,	  the	  sacred	  river,	  ran	  	  
Through	  caverns	  measureless	  to	  man	  	  
Down	  to	  a	  sunless	  sea.	  	  
So	  twice	  five	  miles	  of	  fertile	  ground	  	  
With	  walls	  and	  towers	  were	  girdled	  round:	  	  
And	  there	  were	  gardens	  bright	  with	  sinuous	  rills,	  	  
Where	  blossomed	  many	  an	  incense-­‐bearing	  tree;	  	  
And	  here	  were	  forests	  ancient	  as	  the	  hills,	  	  
Enfolding	  sunny	  spots	  of	  greenery.	  	  	  
But	  oh!	  that	  deep	  romantic	  chasm	  which	  slanted	  	  
Down	  the	  green	  hill	  athwart	  a	  cedarn	  cover!	  	  
A	  savage	  place!	  as	  holy	  and	  enchanted	  	  
As	  e'er	  beneath	  a	  waning	  moon	  was	  haunted	  	  
By	  woman	  wailing	  for	  her	  demon	  lover!	  	  
And	  from	  this	  chasm,	  with	  ceaseless	  turmoil	  seething,	  	  
As	  if	  this	  earth	  in	  fast	  thick	  pants	  were	  breathing,	  	  
A	  mighty	  fountain	  momently	  was	  forced:	  	  
Amid	  whose	  swift	  half-­‐intermitted	  burst	  	  
Huge	  fragments	  vaulted	  like	  rebounding	  hail,	  	  
Or	  chafly	  grain	  beneath	  the	  thresher's	  flail:	  	  
And	  `mid	  these	  dancing	  rocks	  at	  once	  and	  ever	  	  
It	  flung	  up	  momently	  the	  sacred	  river.	  	  
Five	  miles	  meandering	  with	  a	  mazy	  motion	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Through	  wood	  and	  dale	  the	  sacred	  river	  ran,	  	  
Then	  reached	  the	  caverns	  measureless	  to	  man,	  	  
And	  sank	  in	  tumult	  to	  a	  lifeless	  ocean:	  	  
And	  `mid	  this	  tumult	  KubIa	  heard	  from	  far	  	  
Ancestral	  voices	  prophesying	  war!	  	  
The	  shadow	  of	  the	  dome	  of	  pleasure	  	  
Floated	  midway	  on	  the	  waves;	  	  
Where	  was	  heard	  the	  mingled	  measure	  	  
From	  the	  fountain	  and	  the	  caves.	  	  
It	  was	  a	  miracle	  of	  rare	  device,	  	  
A	  sunny	  pleasure	  dome	  with	  caves	  of	  ice!	  	  	  
A	  damsel	  with	  a	  dulcimer	  In	  a	  vision	  once	  I	  saw:	  	  
It	  was	  an	  Abyssinian	  maid,	  	  
And	  on	  her	  dulcimer	  she	  played,	  	  
Singing	  of	  Mount	  Abora.	  	  
Could	  I	  revive	  within	  me	  	  
Her	  symphony	  and	  song,	  	  
To	  such	  a	  deep	  delight	  `twould	  win	  me,	  	  
That	  with	  music	  loud	  and	  long,	  	  	  
I	  would	  build	  that	  dome	  in	  air,	  	  
That	  sunny	  dome!	  those	  caves	  of	  ice!	  	  
And	  all	  who	  heard	  should	  see	  them	  there,	  	  
And	  all	  should	  cry,	  Beware!	  Beware!	  	  
His	  flashing	  eyes,	  his	  floating	  hair!	  	  
Weave	  a	  circle	  round	  him	  thrice,	  	  
And	  close	  your	  eyes	  with	  holy	  dread,	  	  
For	  he	  on	  honeydew	  hath	  fed,	  	  
And	  drunk	  the	  milk	  of	  Paradise.	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